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I. INTRODUCTION

People generally have better things to do than sue themselves.
The same is true for corporations, organizations, and-one would
think-governments. In fact, however, litigation between federal
agencies is surprisingly common, and often arises in interesting
contexts where a lot is at stake.1 But as the D.C. Circuit put it:
"[t]he justiciability of such interagency disputes ...is a complex
and sometimes controversial question that frequently must be
2
addressed by the courts."
Like all litigation, intragovernmental litigation must satisfy the
traditional threshold standards of Article III, including standing
and adverse parties. Yet the federal government is no ordinary
party, and the application of these general principles to a
sovereign is no easy matter. By looking at 200 years of cases, and
keeping in mind the Supreme Court's pronouncements in similar
contexts, I propose that a judicially cognizable "case" may not be
premised on dueling notions of the public good. Courts have
generally been reluctant to hear disputes when both the plaintiff
and defendant agency appear asserting the sovereign interests of
the United States; such disputes are adverse in fiction but not in
fact.
While the Judicial and Executive Branches have wrestled with
the difficulty of interagency litigation, 3 the scholarship has largely
ignored it. In fact, only a handful of articles so much as mention
interagency litigation, 4 and the most recent article on the subject
1 E.g., United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974).

Mail Order Ass'n of Am. v. USPS, 986 F.2d 509, 527 n.9 (D.C. Cir. 1993).
E.g., Admin. Assessment of Civil Penalties Against Fed. Agencies Under the Clean Air
Act, 21 Op. O.L.C. 109 (1997); Enforcement Jurisdiction of the Special Counsel for
Immigration Related Unfair Emp't Practices, 6 Op. O.L.C. 121 (1992); Constitutionality of
Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n's Imposition of Civil Penalties on the Air Force, 13 Op. O.L.C.
131, 138-39 (1989); Proposed Tax Assessment Against the USPS, 1 Op. O.L.C. 79, 80-82
(1977).
4 Lee A. Albert & Larry G. Simon, Enforcing Subpoenas Against the President: The
Question of Mr. Jaworski'sAuthority, 74 COLUM. L. REV. 545, 552-58 (1974); Louis L. Jaffe,
Standing To Secure JudicialReview: PrivateActions, 75 HARV. L. REV. 255, 297-301 (1961);
William K. Kelley, The Constitutional Dilemma of Litigation Under the Independent
Counsel System, 83 MINN. L. REV. 1197, 1213-15 (1999); Michael W. Steinberg, Can EPA
Sue Other Federal Agencies?, 17 ECOLOGY L.Q. 317 (1990); Note, Judicial Resolution of
2
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has been superseded by two decades of decisions. 5 Unlike prior
scholarship, this Article looks at both historical practice and
modern Article III case law and finds meaningful jurisdictional
limits on interagency litigation.
Although this Article focuses on the Executive Branch, this is
not the only arm of the government that seeks judicial
intervention when it cannot make up its mind.6 Recently, the
Supreme Court heard a case brought by the State of Virginia
against the State of Virginia. 7 Governors have opposed actions
brought by their attorneys general.8 And sometimes one branch of
the federal government sues another or even takes up lawyers
against itself.9

Administrative Disputes Between Federal Agencies, 62 HARV. L. REV. 1050 (1949); Note,
Judicial Resolution of Inter-Agency Legal Disputes, 89 YALE L.J. 1595 (1980) [hereinafter
Note, Inter-Agency Legal Disputes] ("Interagency Legal Disputes").
5 Michael Herz, United States v. United States: When Can the Federal Government Sue
Itself?, 32 WM. & MARY L. REV. 893 (1991).
6 For the purposes of this Article, any distinction between agencies in the "Executive
Branch" and in the "headless fourth branch" is immaterial. I use "Executive Branch" to
mean those parts of the U.S. government that are neither judicial nor legislative. The
application of my argument to other entities is left for another time.
7 Va.Office for Prot. & Advocacy v. Stewart, 131 S. Ct. 1632 (2011). Litigation between
municipalities and states is also common. E.g., City of Cleveland v. Ohio, 508 F.3d 827, 834
(6th Cir. 2007); Illinois v. City of Chicago, 137 F.3d 474, 476 (7th Cir. 1998). Sometimes,
even smaller governmental units find themselves on both offense and defense in the same
case, as recently happened to the City of Detroit. See Editorial, A City Legally Divided
Against Itself, DET. NEWS, July 9, 2012, at All.
8 Compare Amicus Brief on Behalf of the Governors of Washington, Colorado, Michigan,
and Pennsylvania in Support of Defendants' Motion for Summary Judgment, Florida v. U.S.
Dep't of Health & Human Servs., No. 3:10-cv-91-RV/EMT (Nov. 19, 2010), 2010 WL
4876892, with Plaintiffs' Memorandum in Opposition to Defendants' Motion for Summary
Judgment, Florida,No. 3:10-cv-91-RV/EMT (Nov. 23, 2010), 2010 WL 4876894 (memo by
attorneys general of those states taking opposing position).
9 Stanley M. Brand, Battle Among the Branches: The Two Hundred Year War, 65 N.C. L.
REV. 901, 904 (1987) ('The issue of which branch is entitled to the mantle of the United
States is more than a matter of trivial nomenclature: it reveals deep-seated and
fundamental views about the proper role of each branch."); Kathleen Clark, Government
Lawyers and Confidentiality Norms, 85 WASH. U. L. REV. 1033, 1064-65 (2007) (describing
competing briefs filed by the Senate Chief Counsel for Employment and the Senate itself
regarding litigation over the Congressional Accountability Act of 1995); Matthew I. Hall,
Standing of Intervenor-Defendants in Public Law Litigation, 80 FORDHAM L. REV. 1539,
1551 (2012).
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In Part II, I explain that the federal judiciary's limited
jurisdiction over "cases" and "controversies" generally precludes a
suit without adverse parties. This requirement of adverseness is
riddled with exceptions and complications and is far more
complicated than the literature to date has acknowledged. 10
Indeed, in its recent decision regarding the Defense of Marriage
Act, the Supreme Court confronted what type of adverseness must
be shown before a federal court may proceed. 1
In Part III, I survey the interesting history of interagency
litigation. Litigation within the government had early roots, from
the Attorney General's unsuccessful 1793 mandamus petition
against the Secretary of War to early lawsuits by the Postmaster
General against deputy postmasters who pocketed more than their
fair share of postage revenue. But only over the past several
decades has interagency litigation become more common, arising
in colorful contexts such as President Nixon's refusal to obey a
subpoena, a government-chartered corporation that boldly tried to
exercise eminent domain over an agency's land, and an agency
that was accused of stealing another's vending machines. Several
rationales have been offered to square these cases with the general
rule that no party can sue itself, but none fully satisfy. Instead, I
argue that these cases can be explained by recognizing the divide
between when an agency alleges a proprietary injury (which has
been allowed) and when both agencies assert a sovereign interest
(which has generally not been permitted).
In Part IV, I explain why litigation between two agencies
asserting sovereign interests is not justiciable. Before a plaintiff
can sue, there must be an identifiable "injury in fact"-a mere
statutory right to sue or an interest in seeing the law obeyed is not
enough. But the United States is different: it has standing based
on its interest in seeing its laws obeyed, its vision of the public
interest vindicated, and its power to regulate unrestrained. These
sovereign interests, I argue, justify standing when the United
10For a notable exception, see generally Martin H. Redish & Andrianna D. Kastanek,
Settlement Class Actions, the Case-Or-Controversy Requirement, and the Nature of the
Adjudicatory Process, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 545 (2006).
11 United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2684-89 (2012).
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States appears adverse to a party other than the government, but
the United States cannot assert a sovereign interest against itself.
Such a suit amounts to little more than a squabble between
bureaucrats over a regulatory agenda, which is not the proper
domain for the judiciary. By studying when interagency litigation
is permitted and when it is not, we can better understand the
nature of the judicial power, as well as what it means for the
"United States" to appear in court.

II. CASES, CONTROVERSIES, AND ADVERSENESS
The Constitution permits the federal courts to exercise
12
jurisdiction over certain enumerated "cases" and "controversies."
These amorphous words begot a slew of overlapping doctrines,
such as standing, the rule against advisory opinions, and the
requirement of adverse parties, all of which "have grown up to
elaborate [Article III's] requirement [and] are 'founded in concern
about the proper-and properly limited-role of the courts in a
democratic society.' "13
A. THE RULES AND THE EXCEPTIONS

The most (in)famous limitation on the federal courts'
jurisdiction is standing. The now-familiar three-prong test of the
current standing doctrine requires a plaintiff to establish "injury
in fact," causation, and redressability in particular ways. 14 Only
one plaintiff in a suit needs to establish standing, 15 but some
plaintiff must have standing for every cause of action asserted in
an action. 16 Under current law, a legal injury is not enough: there
must also be an injury "in fact," although Congress may have some
ability to define the range of cognizable injuries.

See U.S. CONST. art. III.
13 Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 750 (1984) (quoting Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498
(1975)).
14 Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992).
15 Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 518 (2007).
16 City of Los Angeles v. Lyons, 461 U.S. 95, 109 (1983).
12
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The Supreme Court has identified several benefits of limiting
courts to a defined set of contested, fact-intensive controversies. A
plaintiff with an injury supplies specific facts (even if hotly
disputed) on which the court can apply the law.1 7 Dueling
advocates ensure that the issues before the court are fully
explored, and an injured plaintiff is believed to be better motivated
to advance all relevant arguments than an uninterested one. The
Supreme Court has also described standing as a way of limiting
judicial interference with the prerogatives of the elected
branches.1 ' By restricting courts to "judicial" functions, the courts
do what they do best, and the elected branches are left to carry out
their democratically assigned roles over the remainder. But the
Court is quick to note that simply fulfilling the purposes of
standing is not enough to provide jurisdiction where it would
19
otherwise be lacking.
Although standing receives the lion's share of scholarly and
judicial attention, it is but one way to articulate the case-orcontroversy requirement. 20 Another side of the same coin is that
there must be adverse parties, which includes a rule against suing
oneself. 21 This can be described as an inherent part of the case-orcontroversy requirement, 22 and it can be traced to the early17 See Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church & State, Inc.,
454 U.S. 464, 472 (1982) ("It tends to assure that the legal questions presented to the court
will be resolved, not in the rarified atmosphere of a debating society, but in a concrete
factual context conducive to a realistic appreciation of the consequences of judicial action.").
18 See id. at 473 ('The exercise of the judicial power also affects relationships between the
coequal arms of the National Government. The effect is, of course, most vivid when a
federal court declares unconstitutional an act of the Legislative or Executive Branch.").
19 See id. at 475 ("But neither the counsels of prudence nor the policies implicit in the
case or controversy' requirement should be mistaken for the rigorous Art. III requirements
themselves."); Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. To Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 225 (1974)
(finding no jurisdiction even though "the adverse parties sharply conflicted in their interests
and views and were supported by able briefs and arguments").
20 See Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 100 (1968) ("[T]he standing requirement is closely
related to, although more general than, the rule that federal courts will not entertain
friendly suits, or those which are feigned or collusive in nature." (internal citations
omitted)).
21 E.g.,
Brianne J. Gorod, The Adversarial Myth: Appellate Court Extra-Record
Factfinding,61 DUKE L.J. 1, 3, 13 (2011).
22 See, e.g., Muskrat v. United States, 219 U.S. 346, 361 (1911) ("[J]udicial power ... is
the right to determine actual controversies a rising between adverse litigants, duly
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English common law. 23 Like standing, adverseness is thought to
sharpen the presentation of legal issues by having dueling
advocates cast the maximum amount of light on the subject. 24 And
the fact that the parties are adverse to one another suggests that
judicial intervention is needed to resolve a dispute peacefully. 25
The requirement of adverseness is closely linked to the concern
with collusive suits. 26 Some lawyers with questionable ethics feign
suits in order to obtain a favorable ruling to the detriment of a
third party.2 7 But the judiciary's concern with collusion extends
beyond cases brought with ill motive.
The Court has found unfit for adjudication any cause that "is
not in any real sense adversary," that "does not assume the 'honest
instituted in courts of proper jurisdiction."); Hall, supra note 9, at 1551 ("A one-sided 'case'
or 'controversy' is an oxymoron."); Redish & Kastanek, supra note 10, at 567-69 & nn.80-95
(discussing Muskrat's role in developing the case-or-controversy requirement).
Some,
however, describe "case" as having a much different meaning in the eighteenth century-a
meaning that does not require any sort of dispute. E.g., Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., Article III's
Case/ControversyDistinctionand the Dual Functions of Federal Courts, 69 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 447, 449 (1994).
23 Redish & Kastanek, supra note 10, at 565 n.73.
24 See Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186,-204 (1962) ("[Cloncrete adverseness... sharpens the
presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult
constitutional questions."). The necessity of adverseness brings to mind the Supreme
Court's description of cross-examination as the "greatest legal engine ever invented for the
discovery of truth." California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 158 (1970) (quoting 5 JOHN HENRY
WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 1367 (3d ed. 1940)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
25 Chi. & Grand Trunk Ry. Co. v. Welman, 143 U.S. 339, 345 (1892) ('Whenever, in
pursuance of an honest and actual antagonistic assertion of rights by one individual against
another, there is presented a question involving the validity of any act of any legislature,
State or Federal, and the decision necessarily rests on the competency of the legislature to
so enact, the court must, in the exercise of its solemn duties, determine whether the act be
constitutional or not; but such an exercise of power is the ultimate and supreme function of
courts. It is legitimate only in the last resort, and as a necessity in the determination of
real, earnest and vital controversy between individuals.").
26 See Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 505 (1961) (plurality opinion); United States v.
Johnson, 319 U.S. 302, 305 (1943) (per curiam); see also Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 100
(1968) ("[T]he standing requirement is closely related to, although more general than, the
rule that federal courts will not entertain friendly suits or those which are feigned or
collusive in nature." (citation omitted)); Muskrat, 219 U.S. at 361 ("[J]udicial power ... is
the right to determine actual controversies arising between adverse litigants, duly
instituted in courts of proper jurisdiction.").
27 Lord v. Veazie, 49 U.S. 251, 254 (1850) (two brothers as litigants to foreclose claim of
third-party creditor). But see Pennington v. Coxe, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 33, 33 (1804) (deciding
a "feigned issue").
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and actual antagonistic assertion of rights' to be adjudicated-a
safeguard essential to the integrity of the judicial process, and one
which we have held to be indispensable to adjudication of
28
constitutional questions by this Court."
The rule against self-suing also helps to ensure that the
judiciary's power is limited. Without such a rule, Article III's
limited grant of authority to "cases" and "controversies" would be
an empty formalism. Any person could invoke the court to obtain
an opinion. Applying this general principle, courts have long held
29
that a litigant cannot sue itself to create a case.
The adverseness requirement is not without exceptions and
complexities. 30
Article III judges can resolve uncontested
bankruptcy petitions, 3 1 admiralty suits, 32 and naturalization
applications, 33 even though each might involve but a single party.34
To what extent these exceptions can be squared with the general
rule of adverseness is beyond the scope of this Article. 35
28 Poe, 367 U.S. at 505 (quoting Johnson, 319 U.S. at 305).
29 Lord, 49 U.S. at 254; see Gilbert v. Wash. Beneficial Endowment Ass'n, 10 App. D.C.

316, 358 (D.C. Cir. 1897) (describing "the case of Dr. Jekyll suing Mr. Hyde. Such a security
as that is utterly delusive and impossible ....
").
30 See generally Redish & Kastanek, supra note 10.
31 Cont'l Ill. Nat'l Bank & Trust Co. of Chi. v. Chi., Rock Island & Pac. Ry. Co., 294 U.S.
648, 668-74 (1935); William L. Norton, Jr. & Richard Lieb, Ending the Bankruptcy
Jurisdiction Dilemma-An Article III Bankruptcy Court Approach, 67 JUDICARATURE 346,
352 (1984) ("[N]o genuine question exists today as to whether bankruptcy jurisdiction may
be vested in an Article III bankruptcy court.").
32 Eric B. Schnurer, Note, "More Than an Intuition, Less Than a Theory" Toward a
Coherent Doctrine of Standing, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 564, 574 n.61 (1986).
33 Tutun v. United States, 270 U.S. 568, 577 (1926); Susan Low Bloch, The Early Role of
the Attorney General in Our Constitutional Scheme: In the Beginning There Was
Pragmatism,1989 DUKE L.J. 561, 594 n.107.
34 In addition, judges sit on the Sentencing Commission, Mistretta v. United States, 488
U.S. 361, 390 (1989), promulgate rules of procedure, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2071-2075 (2012);
Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 389, and supervise grand juries and review applications for wiretap
and search warrants, Mistretta, 488 U.S. at 389 n.16. These examples, however, arguably
relate to some actual controversy with adverse parties. See Redish & Kastanek, supra note
10, at 587 n.157 (noting that functions such as issuing a warrant are incidental to an
underlying adversarial proceeding).
35 Although these issues warrant further study, I note that adverseness today appears to
depend more on the nature of the interests at stake, and not the adverseness of arguments
before the court. That adverseness depends on interests instead of arguments is clear
enough when a federal court exercises jurisdiction to enter a default judgment against a
party who has forfeited any right to offer argument on his defense. See FED. R. Civ. P. 55.

1226

GEORGIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 47:1217

Significantly, however, each exception involves a plaintiff who has
an injury in fact (to use standing language) and seeks adjudication
of legal rights.
At a high level of generality, I expect most would agree that the
constitutional and policy bases for some justiciability rules are
valid. But the devil is in the details, and it seems we are in hell.
The standing doctrine has been criticized with a consensus and
harshness without equal among other doctrines. 36 Over the past
two decades, the Supreme Court has become increasingly
formalistic in its approach to justiciability, 37 and the disconnect
between stated purpose and doctrine has been, at times, downright
absurd. The current approach is both wildly over- and underinclusive in terms of promoting its billed purposes. 38 For example,
per Lujan, purchasing a plane ticket gets you into court, or even
an injury of a single dollar, but spending much more than that on
attorney's fees does not. 39 But this is not the forum to rehash all of
the arguments that have been made ably elsewhere. Instead, in
this Article, I try to determine and follow justiciability doctrine as
faithfully as possible.

The focus on adverseness was reaffirmed by the Supreme Court's recent reasoning that the
United States' was injured (for Article III purposes) by a judgment against it, even though
the United States' attorneys affirmatively sought that judgment. See United States v.
Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2685-69 (2013). The conclusion also follows from the Supreme
Court's repeated rejection of cases with adverse arguments but no adverse interests. See,
e.g., Hollingsworth v. Perry, 133 S. Ct. 2652, 2663 (2013).
36 See, e.g., Heather Elliott, The Functions of Standing, 61 STAN. L. REV. 459, 466-67
(2008); Daniel E. Ho & Erica L. Ross, Did Liberal Justices Invent the Standing Doctrine?An
Empirical Study of the Evolution of Standing, 1921-2006, 62 STAN. L. REV. 591, 594 (2010)
("[S]tanding remains one of the most contested areas of federal law, with criticisms of the
doctrine nearing the number of commentators.").
37 See Cass R. Sunstein, What's Standing After Lujan? Of Citizen Suits, "Injuries,"and
Article III, 91 MICH. L. REV. 163, 226-27 (1992) (describing requirement that plaintiff
purchase a plane ticket as "unnecessarily formalistic"). Indeed, this reflects a general trend
in separation-of-powers jurisprudence toward simple rules and away from considering the
purpose of the division of power. See, e.g., Stern v. Marshall, 131 S. Ct. 2594, 2619-20
(2011); Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211, 218-19 (1995).
38 See generally Elliott, supra note 36.
39 See Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 579 (1992) (Kennedy, J., concurring in
part and concurring in the judgment) ("[I]t may seem trivial to require that Mses. Kelly and
Skilbred acquire airline tickets to the project sites or announce a date certain upon which
they will return ... ").
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B. THE UNITED STATES AND ITS COURTS

The usual rules on justiciability apply even to the United
States, at least in theory. In practice, however, the federal
government has standing in every situation (except, as discussed
below, when it tries to overturn its own decisions) because it, can
assert sovereign interests in addition to the usual set of common
law injuries that everyone else asserts.
It is a basic principle of standing that litigants' interests in
seeing that the law is obeyed or in vindicating their view of the
public interest is insufficient to establish a right to sue. 40 Unless,
that is, the litigant is the United States: Unlike you or I, the
United States need only assert some sovereign interest-that its
laws have been violated or an injury to the "public interest"-is at
stake to appear in federal court.4 1 When it asserts such an injury,
the United States is exercising its sovereign prerogative to defend
its sovereign interests, which include the interest in governing and
vindicating its vision of the public interest, including "the power to
42
create and enforce a legal code, both civil and criminal."
Of course, the government also has proprietary interests in its
43
property and contracts, just as any private corporation would.
"As a proprietor, it is likely to have the same interests as other
similarly situated proprietors. And like other such proprietors it

40 See, e.g., FEC v. Akins, 524 U.S. 11, 24 (1998) ("The abstract nature of the harm-for
example, injury to the interest in seeing that the law is obeyed--deprives the case of the
concrete specificity that characterized those controversies which were 'the traditional
concern of the courts at Westminster.'" (quoting Coleman v. Miller, 307 U.S. 433, 460
(1939) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting))).
41 Raoul Berger, Intervention by Public Agencies in Private Litigation in the Federal
Courts, 50 YALE L.J. 65 passim (1940); Tara Leigh Grove, Standing as an Article 11
Nondelegation Doctrine, 11 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 781, 792 (2009); Catherine T. Struve,
Sovereign Litigants: Native American Nations in Court, 55 VILL. L. REv. 929, 931-32 (2010);
cf. United States v. Larkin, Hoffman, Daly & Lindgren, LTD., 841 F. Supp. 899, 906-07 (D.
Minn. 1993).
42 Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico ex rel. Barez, 458 U.S. 592, 601 (1982).
States and Indian tribes also may rely, to a lesser extent, on their sovereign interests in
federal court. See generally Nicholas A. Fromherz & Joseph W. Mead, Equal Standing with
States: Tribal Sovereignty and Standing After Massachusetts v. EPA, 29 STAN. ENVTL. L.J.
130 (2010).
43 E.g., Cotton v. United States, 52 U.S. (11 How.) 229, 231 (1850).
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may at times need to pursue those interests in court."44 Thus, the
United States can be harmed in the same manner as a private
corporation, and it also enjoys standing to vindicate injuries to its
common law interests.
The right of the United States to assert what might otherwise
be a generalized grievance is plain enough in the context of a
criminal prosecution.
Thus, the basis for the prosecution's
standing may be nothing more than "the sovereign, seeking to
vindicate the general public interest in compliance with the law." 45
Yet "all concede" that such cases are within the jurisdiction of the
46
federal courts.
And the Supreme Court has repeatedly sanctioned the United
States' reliance on its sovereign powers to bring civil actions as
well. 47 In In Re Debs, the Court held that an inherent aspect of
sovereignty is the right to invoke the nation's courts to enforce its
sovereign prerogatives. 48 Thirty years later, the Supreme Court

44 Snapp & Son, 458 U.S. at 601-02. Generally speaking, the divide between sovereign
and proprietary interests in the context of interagency litigation overlaps with the divide
between an agency's interest as a regulator (a sovereign interest) and the injury an agency
experiences from being regulated by another (a proprietary interest). Cf. Kelley, supra note
4, at 1213 (distinguishing between official- and personal-capacity suits).
45 Edward Hartnett, The Standing of the United States: How Criminal ProsecutionsShow
That Standing Doctrine Is Looking for Answers in All the Wrong Places, 97 MICH. L. REV.
2239, 2248 (1999) (internal quotation mark omitted). Certainly some prosecutions involve
more tangible harm than others to United States' interests, such as when money has been
stolen from the public fisc or at least harm to a citizen under its protection, as when it
brings a case for murder. See id. at 2246-51. But plainly not all prosecutions fall into one
of these two forms. The Court, and in particular Justice Scalia, has also cited the rule
against "generalized grievance" as reserving to the political branches certain classes of
disputes which are more appropriately resolved nonjudicially.
46 Id. at 2251; see also ICC v. Brimson, 154 U.S. 447, 485--86 (1894) (discussing a
hypothetical statute making failure to testify in front of the ICC a violation of federal law
and concluding that a prosecution under that statute "would be a case or controversy within
the meaning of the Constitution').
47 See, e.g., The Amistad, 40 U.S. (15 Pet.) 518, 547-48 (1841) (allowing United States to
intervene as party and appeal adverse judgment based on foreign relations concerns);
Grove, supranote 41, at 792-95 (arguing that the basis of the Executive Branch's authority
to sue is the Take Care Clause); Recent Development, United States Has Nonstatutory
Standing To Sue To Enforce Policiesof a FederalStatute, 64 COLUM. L. REV. 951, 951 (1964)
(discussing United States' standing to sue to enforce its "interest in proper implementation
of the policies of the Civil Relief Act").
48 158 U.S. 564, 582 (1895). The Court wrote:
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once more held that the United States needs no statutory
authorization to bring a suit.49 The Court noted the unique status
of the United States, writing:
This is not a controversy between equals. The United
States is asserting its sovereign power to regulate
commerce and to control the navigable waters within
its jurisdiction. It has a standing in this suit not only
to remove obstruction to interstate and foreign
commerce, the main ground, which we will deal with
last, but also to carry out treaty obligations to a
foreign power ....
[AInd no statute is necessary to
50
authorize the suit.
Later decisions have recognized the United States' power to sue to
vindicate an interest related to any regulatory program, the public
interest more generally, or to articulate its views on the
51
constitutionality of a federal law.
The entire strength of the nation may be used to enforce in any part of the
land the full and free exercise of all national powers and the security of all
rights entrusted by the Constitution to its care. . . . But passing to the
second question, is there no other alternative than the use of force on the
part of the executive authorities whenever obstructions arise to the freedom
of interstate commerce or the transportation of the mails? Is the army the
only instrument by which rights of the public can be enforced and the peace
of the nation preserved? Grant that any public nuisance may be forcibly
abated either at the instance of the authorities, or by any individual
suffering private damage therefrom, the existence of this right of forcible
abatement is not inconsistent with nor does it destroy the right of appeal in
an orderly way to the courts for a judicial determination, and an exercise of
their powers by writ of injunction and otherwise to accomplish the same
result.
Id.; see also United States v. Texas, 143 U.S. 621, 643 (1892) ("The present suit falls in each
class, for it is, plainly, one arising under the Constitution, laws and treaties of the United
States, and, also, one in which the United States is a party. It is, therefore, one to which, by
the express words of the Constitution, the judicial power of the United States extends.").
49 Sanitary Dist. of Chi. v. United States, 266 U.S. 405, 426 (1925).
50 Id. at 425-26.
51 See, e.g., FTC v. Dean Foods Co., 384 U.S. 597, 606 (1966) (finding FTC had standing
to seek injunctive relief despite the absence of explicit statutory authorization); United
States v. Raines, 362 U.S. 17, 27 (1960) ("It is urged that it is beyond the power of Congress
to authorize the United States to bring this action in support of private constitutional
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Thus, the United States can obtain jurisdiction where a private
litigant--even one with congressional authorization-cannot. As
Justice Story wrote, in a slightly different context:
It scarcely seems possible to raise a reasonable doubt
as to the propriety of giving to the national courts
jurisdiction of cases in which the United States are a
party. It would be a perfect novelty in the history of
national jurisprudence, as well as of public law, that a
52
sovereign had no authority to sue in his own courts.
The interest of providing a fair tribunal to protect private rights
supplies more than sufficient grounds to justify the judiciary's
attention, as the alternative is for the executive to use force
against the individual directly. Indeed, it is one of the great
features of our system that the United States must often obtain
permission from an independent and impartial judiciary to inflict
an injury against an individual.
To say that the "United States" has standing glosses over an
important restriction on who speaks for the United States. The
Supreme Court has repeatedly explained that only the Executive
rights.
But there is the highest public interest in the due observance of all the
constitutional guarantees, including those that bear the most directly on private rights, and
we think it perfectly competent for Congress to authorize the United States to be the
guardian of that public interest in a suit for injunctive relief."); SEC v. U.S. Realty &
Improvement Co., 310 U.S. 434, 458-59 (1940) (holding that agency had standing to
intervene to further "the public interests which the Commission was designated to
represent"); see also Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 831 n.2 (1997) ("[Ain injury to official
authority may support standing for a government itself or its duly authorized agents."
(citations omitted)); Larry W. Yackle, A Worthy Champion for Fourteenth Amendment
Rights: The United States in Parens Patriae, 92 Nw. U. L. REV. 111, 115 (1997) (noting
United States' standing to sue to protect the Fourteenth Amendment rights of litigants
whether or not they could do so); Note, Protecting the Public Interest: Nonstatutory Suits by
the United States, 89 YALE L.J. 118, 118 (1979) ("In a series of cases decided during the last
century, the Supreme Court recognized the standing of the United States, with or without
statutory authority, to sue to protect the public interest."). Some have argued, however,
that the early Supreme Court was uneasy with (or even hostile to) nonstatutory suits by the
Executive. Ann Woolhandler & Michael G. Collins, State Standing, 81 VA. L. REV. 387, 434
(1995).
52 2 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES § 1674
(Melville M. Bigelow ed., 5th ed. William S. Hein & Co., Inc. 1994) (1833).
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Branch-not Congress, and not private parties-may assert the
sovereign interests of the United States,5 3 and it has done so both
in terms of the Take Care Clause 54 as well as standing. 55
But what happens when the United States sues itself?

III. WHAT'S BEEN DONE-LITIGATION BETWEEN THE UNITED
STATES AND THE UNITED STATES
A. THE FIRST 100 YEARS

Although litigation between two departments of the United
States government probably would have been unfathomable at the
nation's founding, 56 the issue came up in somewhat surprising
ways (and surprisingly early in the nation's history). One of the
judiciary's earliest confrontations with justiciability-Hayburn's
Case-at one point lacked a private litigant. 57 The Invalid
Pensions Act authorized payments to veterans who became
disabled during the Revolutionary War. Controversially, the law
required federal judges to process applications for benefits and
make recommendations to the Secretary of War. 58 Although the
Supreme Court never issued an opinion as a body on the issue, all
six Justices viewed the law's use of the judiciary to be
unconstitutional, 59 and the Justices' letters set an important
60
precedent still relied on to this day.
53 See Grove, supra note 41, at 794. There are limited exceptions when the judiciary can
appoint a prosecutor to vindicate some judicial interest. See Young v. United States ex rel.
Vuitton et Fils S.A., 481 U.S. 787, 793 (1987) (holding that "courts possess inherent
authority to initiate contempt proceedings for disobedience to their orders, authority which
necessarily encompasses the ability to appoint a private attorney to prosecute the
contempt"); cf. Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988).
54 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 3; Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 138 (1976); Myriam E. Gilles,
RepresentationalStanding: U.S. ex rel. Stevens and the Future of Public Law Litigation, 89
CAL. L. REV. 315, 344, 353-54 (2001); Grove, supranote 41, at 805 n.103.
15 E.g., Byrd, 521 U.S. at 816-17; Newdow v. U.S. Congress, 313 F.3d 495, 497 (9th Cir.
2002); Hall, supra note 9, at 1576-77.
16 Bloch, supra note 33, at 627-28 & n.214.
57 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 409, 410 n.t (1792).
58 Id.
59 Id.

60 See, e.g., Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211, 218-19 (1995). The lesson
usually drawn from this decision is that the judicial power includes the ability to decide a
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. Of relevance here are the procedural machinations behind this
important case. Disabled veteran William Hayburn petitioned for
pension benefits under the Act, but he resided in a circuit where
the judges refused to process such applications.6 1 He then solicited
the assistance of the Attorney General, who filed a writ of
mandamus in the Supreme Court against the lower court judge
who had refused to process Hayburn's application. 62 The Justices
disagreed over whether the Attorney General had a "right, under
such circumstances, and in a case of this kind, to proceed ex
officio,"6 3 and as a result the Court refused to hear his suit.6 4 The
Attorney General then agreed to represent Hayburn as his private
lawyer and re-filed the petition on behalf of Hayburn. The
Supreme Court raised no objection to Hayburn's application but
65
declined to issue a ruling until that case became moot.
The Attorney General's defense of the constitutionality of the
Invalid Pensions Act continued the following year. Congress
expressly authorized the Attorney General to sue, 66 so he again
brought an ex officio writ of mandamus directed against the
Secretary of War. 67 This action was brought pursuant to an
agreement between the Attorney General and the Secretary of
War, and neither the Secretary of War (nor any other litigant)
opposed the motion. 68 Despite the explicit statutory authorization,
some Justices still questioned the Attorney General's power to

case, and courts are not in the business of issuing advisory opinions. Id. This formulation,
although seemingly straightforward, hides considerable complexity not relevant to this
Article. To take one example: through the pardon power, the President can nullify criminal
convictions, yet no one doubts that criminal prosecutions are within the judicial power of
the United States. See DeSilva v. DiLeonardi, 125 F.3d 1110, 1113 (7th Cir. 1997) ('"The
Constitution itself allows the President to block enforcement of a criminal judgment by
issuing a pardon.").
61 Bloch, supra note 33, at 597-98.
62 Id. at 598.
63 Hayburn's Case, 2 U.S. at 409.
6 See Filarsky v. Delia, 132 S. Ct. 1657, 1663 (2012); Bloch, supra note 33, at 607.
65 Bloch, supra note 33, at 599 n.122.
66 Id. at 610 & n.163 (citing Act of Feb. 28, 1793, ch. 17, § 3, 1 Stat. 324, 325 (entitled "An
Act to Regulate the Claims to Invalid Pensions")).
67 Id. at 610 & n.164.
68 See id.
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proceed, and the Attorney General abandoned his effort. 69 Thus,
even express congressional authorization was not enough for the
70
Supreme Court to hear the suit.
In her thorough exploration of this issue, Professor Bloch
argues that the Court was troubled by a lack of an explicit
presidential directive to bring the suit, 7 1 a concern that certainly
would not bother courts today. But it is also possible that the
Justices were troubled by the lack of a justiciable controversy
when the Attorney General and the Secretary of War were the
only parties. 72 Relatedly, the Justices might have questioned the
Attorney General's standing to bring this suit.7 3 In any event, the
precedent
permitting
early
avoided
setting an
Court
intragovernment litigation, although it also managed to avoid
saying anything clear on the subject.
Although dodging the issue in Hayburn's Case, the Court was
asked the following year to provide "advice" to President
The
Washington on twenty-nine foreign policy questions. 74
President's cabinet disagreed over the proper answer to many of
these questions, and the Executive Branch looked to the Supreme
Court for guidance.7 5 The Justices famously declined to opine on
the questions, citing "[t]he lines of separation drawn by the
69 Id. at 610.
70 See id. at 599. A decade later, the Supreme Court famously concluded that it lacked
jurisdiction to issue a writ of mandamus against an executive official. See Marbury v.
Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 176 (1803). But as Professor Bloch explains, the Supreme
Court saw no trouble with its jurisdiction over such cases during the first decade, and it is
"highly unlikely" that this troubled the Court in 1793. Bloch, supra note 33, at 613 n.175;
see also United States v. Lawrence, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 42, 53 (1795) (mandamus brought
against circuit judge that refused to issue warrant).
71 Bloch, supra note 33, at 613-14.
72 Id. at 611 ("In today's parlance, the justices might have questioned first, whether there
exists a justiciable controversy when the Attorney General sues the Secretary of War
pursuant to an agreement reached under orders from Congress .. ");see also Yackle,
supra note 51, at 115 n.12 (noting that some have suggested that Hayburn's Case "reflects
constitutional complications arising from the government 'litigating with itself ").
73 Bloch, supra note 33, at 599.
74 See Russell Wheeler, ExtrajudicialActivities of the Early Supreme Court, 1973 SUP.
CT. REV. 123, 144-58 (discussing the request and the motivations of the Justices in
declining to provide advice).
75 William R. Casto, The Early Supreme Court Justices' Most Significant Opinion, 29
OHIO N.U. L. REV. 173, 181 (2002).
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Constitution between the three departments of the government."76
Instead, Chief Justice John Jay wrote on behalf of the Court, the
77
President was left to seek advice from the heads of departments.
Like Hayburn's Case, this exchange is cited as precedent against
issuing advisory opinions, which in this context means resolving
legal issues before a case requires judicial attention.7 8 But, like
Hayburn's Case, it could also suggest that the early Court was
unwilling to provide a judicial forum for disagreements within the
government.
The early judiciary also had to wrestle with the mandamus
action.
Most mandamus actions, like Marbury v. Madison,
involving a private citizen's request for mandamus relief against
79
an Executive Branch official for a nondiscretionary duty.
Mandamus actions were often captioned as being brought on
behalf of the "United States" (on the relation of the petitioner)
against one of its officers in an official capacity.80 But this was
mere pleading, nothing more: generally, the litigation was in fact
brought by a private citizen who had to show a personal injury to
establish a claim for relief.81 "The real parties to the[se] dispute[s]
82
were, therefore, the relators and the United States."
76 RICHARD H. FALLON, JR. ET AL., HART AND WECHSLER'S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE
FEDERAL SYSTEM 79 (6th ed. 2009) (reprinting August 8, 1793 letter from Chief Justice Jay
to President Washington).
77 Id.
78 E.g., United States v. Sharpe, 470 U.S. 675, 726 n.17 (1985) (Stevens, J., dissenting);
FALLON, supra note 76, at 79-80.
79 5 U.S. (1 Cranch.) 137 (1803); see also Jerry L. Mashaw, Rethinking JudicialReview of
Administrative Action: A Nineteenth Century Perspective, 32 CARDOZO L. REV. 2241, 2247
(2011) (collecting cases).
80 See, e.g., United States ex rel. Greathouse v. Dern, 289 U.S. 352 (1933); Kendall v.
United States ex rel. Stokes, 37 U.S. (12 Pet.) 524 (1838).
81 Kendall, 37 U.S. at 612. There is contrary authority in early cases that appears to
suggest that anyone can enforce a public right, even without a personal interest in the
proceeding. See Craig A. Stern, Another Sign from Hein: Does the Generalized Grievance
Fail a Constitutionalor a PrudentialTest of Federal Standing To Sue?, 12 LEWIS & CLARK
L. REV. 1169, 1189-91 (2008) (collecting authority).
82 Kendall, 37 U.S. at 611. On occasion, the Attorney General would seek mandamus as
a way of appealing the action of a lower court judge. In 1795, for instance, the Attorney
General brought a petition for a writ of mandamus on behalf of the United States against a
district court judge who refused to issue the Executive Branch a requested warrant. United
States v. Lawrence, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 42, 42 (1795). The Supreme Court unanimously
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Although mandamus petitions are not as common today, they
share some similarities to the qui tam action, which also dates
back to English common law8 3 and the early years of the
republic.8 4 Qui tam actions-short for a Latin phrase meaning
"who as well for the king as for himself sues in this matter"8 5supply a bounty to a successful relator who recovers money
belonging to the government. These actions are often brought
against private entities but cannot be brought against the
government.8 6 Like mandamus petitions, the qui tam plaintiffrelator formally sues on behalf of the United States, in part
because any recovery is split with the government. But unlike the
mandamus petition, the qui tam plaintiff-relator need not
establish any personal injury beyond the promised bounty. Thus,
the plaintiff-relator's standing is entirely derivative of the United
States' as a partial assignee of the government's proprietary
interest.8 7 (Later commentary would argue that the Supreme
Court's decision approving of qui tam actions confirms that
sovereign interests cannot be assigned to a private party.8 8 ) Yet
the presence of an interested private party establishes a

concluded that it had no power to grant the writ because the judge "was acting in a judicial
capacity." Id. at 53. This decision appears to be based on an interpretation of the scope of
the common law mandamus action rather than a constitutional or jurisdictional holding.
See Susan Low Bloch & Maeva Marcus, John Marshall's Selective Use of History in
Marbury v. Madison, 1986 WIS. L. REV. 301, 327 n.102 ('The Court appears never to have
questioned its jurisdiction."). But the Attorney General never sought mandamus against
another executive branch officer.
83 Vt. Agency of Natural Res. v. United States ex rel. Stevens, 529 U.S. 765, 776-77
(2000); see generally J. Randy Beck, The False Claims Act and the English Eradicationof
Qui Tam Legislation, 78 N.C. L. REV. 539, 565-608 (2000) (discussing the original intent of
qui tam suits as well as their eventual legislative abolition).
84 Stevens, 529 U.S. at 776-77.
85 The Latin phrase is qui tam pro domino rege quam pro se ipso in hac parte sequitur.
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1368 (9th ed. 2009).
s6 Compare, e.g., United States ex rel. Holmes v. Consumer Ins. Grp., 318 F.3d 1199 (10th
Cir. 2003) (en banc), with Juliano v. Fed. Asset Disposition Ass'n, 736 F. Supp. 348, 352
(D.D.C. 1990) (rejecting qui tam action against the United States agency because "plaintiff
and defendant are one").
87 The interest that the private relator can assert, however, is only the government's
proprietary interest (such as a loss of funds) rather than a sovereign interest. Stevens, 529
U.S. at 771-73; Grove, supra note 41, at 805 n.103.
88 Gilles, supra note 54, at 344, 353-54; Grove, supra note 41, at 805 n.103.
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controversy, despite the formal designation of the United States on
both sides of the case. 9
Efforts to steal from the government are not new, and the early
United States occasionally had to collect debts through litigation.
Sometimes, this meant the government had to sue its own
contractors.
Consider the early Post Office, a government
corporation headed by the Postmaster General, who appointed
regional "deputy postmasters" to manage the financial and
logistical aspects of carrying the mail. 90 Every three months, these
deputies were required to account for their revenue and
expenditures and pay into the public treasury the net profit. 9 1 But
the deputies could not always be trusted to timely pay their due, so
Congress authorized the Postmaster General "to cause a suit to be
commenced" against a recalcitrant deputy. 92 The Supreme Court
found that this law, as amended, fell within the ambit of the
93
circuit courts' federal question jurisdiction.
89 Stevens, 529 U.S. at 776-77; Evan Caminker, Comment, The Constitutionality of Qui
Tam Actions, 99 YALE L.J. 341, 381-87 (1989). Further, although qui tam and mandamus
actions may be brought against an employee or officer of the United States, they are never
brought against the United States itself or an agency. The common premise of both actions
is that the official has acted in violation of a statutory duty. In a sense, then, the action is
against the official in a private capacity because the official has been charged with acting
beyond the office's power. Cf. Ex Parte Young, 209 U.S. 123, 159 (1908) ("The act to be
enforced is alleged to be unconstitutional, and if it be so, the use of the name of the State to
enforce an unconstitutional act to the injury of complainants is a proceeding without the
authority of and one which does not affect the State in its sovereign or governmental
capacity."). Of course, as a formal matter, mandamus actions are usually brought against
the official in an official capacity and automatically substitute a successor official as a
defendant if the original official resigns. See FED. R. APP. P. 43(c)(2).
90 1 Stat. 232, 234 (1794); see generally Anuj C. Desai, The Transformation of Statutes
into Constitutional Law: How Early Post Office Policy Shaped Modern First Amendment
Doctrine, 58 HASTINGS L.J. 671 (2007).
91 1 Stat. at 234.

Id. at 238.
93 Post Master Gen. of the U.S. v. Early, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 136, 147-49 (1827).
Curiously, the Court distinguished between a suit brought by the "United States" and a suit
brought by the Postmaster General (even in his official capacity), suggesting that the latter
suit could not take advantage of the jurisdiction of courts to hear cases to which the United
States was a party. Id.; see also Osborn v. Bank of United States, 22 U.S. 738, 825-26
(1824) ('The Postmaster General, for example, cannot sue under that part of the
[C]onstitution which gives jurisdiction to the federal Courts, in consequence of the character
92

of the party."); 3 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED

STATES § 1680 (1st ed. 1833) (same).
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Several decades later, the Supreme Court was again confronted
with the Executive Branch on both sides of a dispute. 94 During the
Civil War, a Union gunship seized a vessel owned by an Alabaman
that attempted to run a Union blockade. 95 The United States
claimed title to the vessel as a spoil of war, and the district court
condemned it in favor of the captors. 96 However, in the meantime,
the owner of the vessel convinced the Secretary of Treasury that
the owner was loyal to the United States and was attempting to
flee to nonrebel territory. 97 As a result, the Secretary issued an
order of remission, and the owner of the vessel tried to rely on this
98
order to preserve his claim to title.
The Assistant Attorney General argued on behalf of the United
States that the prior owner's title to the vessel was forfeited, and
that the remission from the Treasury did not salvage the
claimant's title. 99 The Solicitor of the Treasury (who then had
what was effectively independent litigating authority'00 ) appeared
and sought to argue the effect of the order of remission. 10 1 The
Court held that when "the United States is a party" and is
represented by the Attorney General, "no counsel can be heard in
opposition on behalf of any other of the departments of the
government."' 0 2 The Court did not explain whether its reluctance
94 The Gray Jacket II, 72 U.S. (5 Wall.) 370 (1866).

95 The Gray Jacket I, 72 U.S. (5 Wall.) 342, 365-66 (1866); see also Andrew Kent, The
Constitution and the Laws of War During the Civil War, 85 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1839,
1916-17 (2010).
9 Gray Jacket I, 72 U.S. at 351.
97 Id.
98 Id.

99Id. at 352. Also arguing on behalf of this position was counsel for the captors. Id.
100 As part of the Judiciary Act of 1789, the Attorney General was given responsibility for

litigating "all suits in the Supreme Court in which the United States shall be concerned." 1
Stat. 73, 92-93 (1789). But between 1820 and 1870, the Solicitor of the Treasury had rival
authority. 4 Stat. 414 (1830); see also Sewall Key, The Legal Work of the Federal
Government, 25 VA. L. REV. 165, 177-81 (1938) (describing the establishment of the
Solicitor of the Treasury).
10,Gray Jacket II, 72 U.S. at 371.
102 Id. at 371; see also The Confiscation Cases, 74 U.S. 454, 458 (1868) ("[N]o counsel will
be heard for the United States in opposition to the views of the Attorney-General, not even
when employed in behalf of another of the executive departments of the government.").
However, the Court allowed the Solicitor to argue because Treasury's counsel (and all other
parties) assumed that he would be permitted to argue. Gray Jacket II,72 U.S. at 371.
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to permit another department to appear was based on prudential,
statutory, or constitutional considerations.1 0 3 Regardless, with or
without Treasury's participation, there was plainly a controversy
between the vessel's owner, the captors, and the United States.
In sum, the early history is not conclusive, but it is consistent
with a general skepticism towards judicial intervention when
there are no private interests at stake. However, since Gray
Jacket, differences of opinion within the federal government have
at times been presented to courts in proceedings involving at least
some private litigants. 10 4 Consistent with the rule that one
plaintiff needs to establish standing for a case to proceed, 10 5 the
government's difference of opinion does not defeat a controversy
that already existed, nor does it create a controversy where one did
06
not exist before.
But what about when the entire case consists solely of the
United States?
B. UNITED STATES V. UNITED STATES IN THE SUPREME COURT

Over the past sixty years, courts have dealt directly with
lawsuits where the only controversy is between two agencies. The
Supreme Court has twice expressly permitted such litigation to
103 Robert E. Johnston, Note, 1001 Attorneys General: Executive-Employee Qui Tam Suits
and the Constitution, 62 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 609, 624 (1994).
104 See, e.g., Udall v. Fed. Power Comm'n, 387 U.S. 428, 433 (1967) (Secretary of Interior
intervened in challenge to Federal Power Commission's order); Sec'y of Agric. v. United
States, 350 U.S. 162 (1956) (Secretary of Agriculture and United States intervened in suit
to challenge ICC's order regarding railroad liability for broken eggs); United States v. FCC,

652 F.2d 72 (D.C. Cir. 1980); In re Pfleiger, 254 F. 511 (S.D.N.Y. 1918) (Learned Hand, J.)
(noting that Department of Labor objected to argument made by Department of Justice);
Alabama v. United States, 56 F. Supp. 478, 484 (W.D. Ky. 1944) ("The United States of
America filed an answer pointing out that the proceedings presented a situation where one
Government agency was opposing another Government agency, and in view of the fact that
both Government agencies would have an opportunity to present their respective positions
by their own counsel it would take a neutral position without prejudice to its later support
of one or the other agency in any appeal that might be taken from the decree of the Court."),
rev'd, 325 U. S. 535 (1945).
105 E.g.,

Horne v. Flores, 557 U.S. 433, 445 (2009).
Herz, supra note 5, at 981 ("Arguably, as long as litigation is already taking place
between a private party and the government, other governmental parties should be able to
join or file companion suits.").
106
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proceed, but only with a number of caveats that have been
overlooked at times by lower courts.
The earliest case arose against the backdrop of World War 11.107
To meet the demands of war, the U.S. government shipped a large
amount of goods to a port over the railways. With stereotypical
generosity, the railways charged the government the full regulated
rate, even though the government-not railroad staff-serviced
the shipment. 0
When the government argued before the
Interstate Commerce Commission, which regulated the railways,
that the rate should have been abated because it did all the work,
it lost. 0 9 The government thereafter challenged the Commission's
decision in district court. 110 Although the Civil Division of the
Department of Justice both formally brought the suit challenging
the ICC decision and defended against that challenge,"' in reality
the defense was supplied by lawyers from the ICC and from the
2
railroads, which intervened to defend of the order."
In the district court, a three-judge panel dismissed the
complaint on the grounds that no party may sue itself, but the
Supreme Court reversed." 3 The Court "look[ed] behind the names
that symbolize[d] the parties to determine whether a justiciable
case or controversy [was] presented."" 4 The case was really not
between the government and itself, the Court concluded, but "to
settle who is legally entitled to sums of money, the Government or
the railroads." 1 5
Such an action is "of a type which [is]
traditionally justiciable," and the Court concluded that the

107 United States v. ICC, 337 U.S. 426 (1949); see also Kelley, supranote 4, at 1213 (noting
that "[t]he most prominent and extended judicial discussion of this question came in United
States v. ICC').
108See United States v. ICC, 78 F. Supp. 580, 581 (D.D.C. 1948), rev'd, 337 U.S. 426
(1949).

109Id.
110 Id.
1 See id. at 582-83 (noting that both the petition and answer were "signed by the same
Assistant Attorney General").
112 337 U.S. at 432. The presence of railroads as a party dispels any doubt that there was
a justiciable controversy: that is, one between the United States and the railroads.
113Id. at 429, 444.
114 Id. at 430.
115 Id.
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government had a judicial recourse to fight the railroads' alleged
illegal overcharging. 116
Although United States v. ICC is generally cited for the
proposition that the United States can sue itself, the case is better
understood as an exception to the general prohibition on such
suits.
In fact, the Court expressly confirmed the "general
principle" that "no person may sue himself," including the United
States, because courts "do not engage in the academic pastime of
' 17
rendering judgments in favor of persons against themselves."
One commentator summarized the ICC decision: "The government
may well be unable to sue itself, then, but that is not what it was
118
doing in this case."
The Supreme Court again had to grapple with interagency
litigation a few years later in United States ex rel. Chapman v.
FederalPower Commission, when the Secretary of the Interior and
a private trade association challenged a ruling of the Federal
Power Commission. 119 The Secretary asserted standing based on
his "statutory duty to act as sole marketing agent of power
developed at public hydroelectric projects."'120 The Supreme Court
found that it had jurisdiction, but it could not identify a reason
why. Instead, the Supreme Court simply wrote:
We hold that petitioners have standing. Differences
of view, however, preclude a single opinion of the
Court as to both petitioners. It would not [add] further
clarification of this complicated specialty of federal
jurisdiction, the solution of whose problems is in any
event more or less determined by the specific
circumstances of individual situations, to set out the
divergent grounds in support of standing in these
cases.

116
117
113

12 1

Id. at 430-31.
Id. at 430.
Herz, supra note 5, at 941.

119 345 U.S. 153 (1953).
120
121

Id. at 155.
Id. at 156.
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Although Chapman does not directly provide insight on the limits
of federal jurisdiction, the Court's difficulty on this issue
emphasizes the controversial and difficult nature of the question.
A few decades later, President Nixon's legal troubles gave rise
to a decision 122 proving the old adage that bad facts make bad law.
A special prosecutor was appointed and delegated power by the
Attorney General, who promised not to interfere with the
prosecutor's work. 123 The prosecutor subpoenaed President Nixon
for certain documents, which he resisted on the grounds of
privilege.1 24 When the prosecutor filed suit, the President argued,
among other things, that there was no justiciable lawsuit because
both sides were part of the Executive Branch. 125 Noting the nature
of the legal question (assessing a privilege), the proceeding
(criminal prosecution), the formal independence of the prosecutor
from the President, and the "steadfast" opposition of the parties,
the Court concluded that there was a justiciable controversy under
the "unique facts" of the case.1 26 As will be seen, lower courts have
read this case outside of its unique context in allowing interagency
litigation. The case also serves as legal support for litigation
arising under the Independent Counsel Act, which authorizes an
independent lawyer, appointed by a court, to exercise the
investigatory and prosecutorial duties of the United States, subject
127
to limited removal by the Attorney General.
In 1991, the Supreme Court was once more presented with an
interagency dispute, this time between the Secretary of Labor and
the Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission. 128 The
Secretary petitioned for review of the Commission's decision to
See United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974).
Id. at 694-95, 696.
124 Id. at 696-97
125 Id. at 692.
126 Id. at 697.
127 See, e.g., John Q. Barrett, All or Nothing, or Maybe Cooperation: Attorney General
Power, Conduct, and Judgment in Relation to the Work of an Independent Counsel, 49
MERCER L. REV. 519, 522 (1998) (discussing Ken Starr's use of Nixon during his turn as
Independent Counsel investigating President Clinton's alleged wrongdoing); see generally
Kelley, supra note 4, at 1201-10 (reviewing intrabranch litigation involving Independent
Counsels from 1974 to 1993).
12s Martin v. Occupational Safety & Health Review Comm'n, 499 U.S. 144 (1996).
122
123
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disallow the Secretary's efforts to enforce a citation against a
private company. 129
That company intervened, 130 and the
Commission, although nominally a party, did not participate in the
circuit court and appeared only as an amicus before the Supreme
Court. 13 1 Although the Court did not comment on jurisdiction, the
presence of a private party is critical. 132 In this somewhat unusual
procedural posture, the adjudicating agency is analogous to a
district court and thus has no interest in defending its judgment
133
on appeal, despite being named as a respondent.
C. UNITED STATES V. UNITED STATES IN THE LOWER COURTS

Litigation in the lower courts involving solely federal
government parties follows a few patterns but includes
inconsistent and unreasoned outlying decisions. In many cases,
the trouble with intragovernment litigation is not raised.
Although courts do have a duty to assess their own jurisdiction,
"[w]hen a potential jurisdictional defect is neither noted nor
discussed in a federal decision, the decision does not stand for the
proposition that no defect existed." 134 Yet despite these caveats,
the lower courts have tended to assert jurisdiction over
interagency disputes, either explicitly or silently.
One type of suit deals with the distribution of money or
property between agencies. Federal Circuit precedent holds that
no controversy exists when money is to be moved from one
129

Id. at 150.

130 See id. at 146 (noting that the respondent's case was argued by a lawyer representing

the private company, CF&I Steel Corp.).
131 Brief for the Petitioner at 7 n.6, Martin, 499 U.S. 144 (No. 89-1541), 1990 WL 508097,
at *7 n.6 ("The Commission was a nominal respondent in the court of appeals (pursuant to
Fed.R.App.P. 15(a)), but did not participate in those proceedings, in accordance with its
statutory role as a purely adjudicatory agency.").
132However, other courts have silently asserted jurisdiction over such petitions, even in
the absence of an interested private party. E.g., Reich v. Occupational Safety & Health
Review Comm'n, 998 F.2d 134, 137 (3d Cir. 1993); Sec'y of Labor v. Occupational Safety &
Health Review Comm'n, 980 F.2d 1273 (9th Cir. 1992) (unopposed petition for review).
133 Hinson v. NTSB, 57 F.3d 1144, 1147 n.1 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (stating that adjudicator has
no cognizable interest as a party).
134Ariz. Christian Sch. Tuition Org. v. Winn, 131 S. Ct. 1436, 1448-49 (2011) (collecting
cases).
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government pot to another. For example, the Federal Deposit
Insurance Corporation (FDIC) sometimes sues the United States
as successor to the interests of a failed financial institution. 135 But
when any judgment will only accrue to the FDIC's coffers, 136 no
justiciable controversy exists, 137 because "none of the money paid
by the government in satisfaction of such a judgment would leave
138
the government."'
Other courts have agreed that disputes within the federal
government over money or property are not justiciable. 139 For
example, the Tennessee Valley Authority, a government-chartered
corporation, attempted to condemn land owned by the Farmers'
Home Administration to obtain an easement for a new power
line. 140 The court rejected the lawsuit because there was no
"identity separate or distinct" from that of the United States;
135E.g., Landmark Land Co. v. FDIC, 256 F.3d 1365, 1379 (Fed. Cir. 2001).

For example, when the FDIC takes over and liquidates a failing financial institution,
the FDIC becomes a high-priority creditor entitled to be reimbursed by the institution
before others. See 12 U.S.C. § 1821(d)(11) (2006).
137Landmark Land Co., 256 F.3d at 1380; see also FDIC v. United States, 342 F.3d 1313,
1317-18 (Fed. Cir. 2003) (rejecting the FDIC's attempt to distinguish Landmark Land Co.);
Glass v. United States, 258 F.3d 1349, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 2001) (finding no justiciability for the
same reason as Landmark Land Co., which was issued concurrently).
138 Landmark Land Co., 256 F.3d at 1380. Other courts have disagreed, finding that they
could hear the Tennessee Valley Authority's suit for money against the government because
there was sufficient tension between the Authority and an Executive Branch agency. See
TVA v. United States, 51 Fed. Cl. 284, 287 (2001) ("We are satisfied, if we needed any other
proof than the vigorous conduct of the litigation heretofore, that opposing interests are
before us with respect to the type of controversy that this court is equipped to address."); see
also TVA v. United States, 13 Cl. Ct. 692, 699 (1987) ('The dispute between TVA and DOE
is not illusory.").
139E.g., Juliano v. Federal Asset Disposition Ass'n, 736 F. Supp. 348, 352-53 (D.D.C.
1990), affd, 959 F.2d 1101 (D.C. Cir. 1992) (table); see also Sweeney v. FDIC, 116 F.3d 942
(D.C. Cir. 1997) (table) (following Juliano in qui tam action); Emps. Welfare Comm. v.
Daws, 599 F.2d 1375, 1377-78 (5th Cir. 1979) (suit for declaratory and injunctive relief as
well as damages against local postmaster by USPS arm for conversion of property); Def.
Supplies Corp. v. U.S. Lines Co., 148 F.2d 311, 312-13 (2d Cir. 1945) (suit brought by
wholly owned government corporation against the United States based on dispute over
liability for damaged wool); United States v. Easement & Right of Way, 204 F. Supp. 837,
839 (E.D. Tenn. 1962) (government corporation attempted to exercise eminent domain
against another agency); cf. United States v. Shell Oil Co., 605 F. Supp. 1064, 1084 (D. Colo.
1985) (refusing to join Army as a defendant in United States' suit to require private party to
clean up site).
140 Easement & Right of Way, 204 F. Supp. at 838.
136
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therefore, "there could not be any issue between the TVA and the
FHA, both being the United States, which this Court could litigate
or adjudicate. Any differences between these agencies would at
most be interagency disputes which are not subject to settlement
141
by adjudication."
Courts have also avoided other disputes over government
property. Consider an example from the Fifth Circuit. For
twenty-five years, the Employees Welfare Committee (an
instrumentality of the U.S. Post Office) operated vending
machines and other facilities for the benefit of Miami Post Office
employees. 142 But in 1973, for reasons now lost to history, the
postmaster abruptly dissolved the committee, destroyed the
vending machines, and installed new ones. 143 The committee sued
the post office for damages and injunctive relief, but the Fifth
Circuit concluded that the plaintiff "as an arm of an agency of the
United States government cannot bring suit against the
government." 144 Twenty years prior, the Second Circuit reached a
similar conclusion in a contract action brought by a wholly owned
government corporation against the United States seeking
compensation for wool that was damaged during its cross-ocean
journey. 145 In contrast, however, at least one court has held that
contract actions brought by one agency against another are
146
justiciable.
The most common type of interagency suit involves one agency
as an employer and the other as an enforcer of federal labor laws.
For example, the Federal Labor Relations Authority (FLRA)
regulates the labor practices of federal agencies 147 and frequently
finds itself pitted against other federal agencies.1 48 The FLRA is
Id. at 839.
Daws, 599 F.2d at 1376-77.
143 Id. at 1377.
144 Id. at 1378.
145 Def. Supplies Corp. v. U.S. Lines Co., 148 F.2d 311, 312-13 (2d Cir. 1945).
146 Dean v. Herrington, 668 F. Supp. 646, 652 (E.D. Tenn. 1987).
147 5 U.S.C. §§ 7104-7105 (2006). The FLRA is free from the statutory obligation to
submit to Department of Justice representation. Id. § 7105(h).
148 E.g., IRS v. FLRA, 494 U.S. 922 (1990); EEOC v. FLRA, 476 U.S. 19 (1986); Dep't of
the Air Force v. FLRA, 680 F.3d 826 (D.C. Cir. 2012); PTO v. FLRA, 672 F.3d 1095 (D.C.
Cir. 2012); Dep't of the Treasury v. FLRA, 670 F.3d 1315 (D.C. Cir. 2012); Dep't of the Navy
141

142
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an unusual creature, having been created solely to regulate the
federal government.
Federal agencies have been expressly
authorized to seek judicial review of adverse FLRA orders. 149 The
courts have not been asked to directly confront the justiciability of
the FLRA's disputes with other agencies but have nonetheless
150
silently asserted jurisdiction over many.
Like the FLRA, the Merit Systems Protection Board (MSPB)
oversees the personnel practices of federal agencies. And yet the
MSPB lacks authority to commence an enforcement suit against a
recalcitrant agency. 151 This was no accident: following the advice
of the Department of Justice, 152 President Reagan vetoed
legislation that would have permitted the MSPB's Office of Special
Counsel to litigate against the government, in part because
"permitting the executive branch to litigate against itself conflicts
with constitutional limitations on the exercise of the judicial power
of the United States to actual cases or controversies between
53
parties with concretely adverse interests."'
And yet the MSPB can litigate against at least one other
agency. The Office of Personnel Management (OPM) can, and
occasionally does, seek judicial review if an order of the Board will
substantially impact civil service rules. 5 4 In Horner v. MSPB, the
Federal Circuit rejected an argument that the court lacked
jurisdiction over OPM's appeal when the claims of the underlying

v. FLRA, 665 F.3d 1339 (D.C. Cir. 2012); Dep't of Homeland Sec. v. FLRA, 647 F.3d 359
(D.C. Cir. 2011); NLRB v. FLRA, 2 F.3d 1190 (D.C. Cir. 1993); see also 5 U.S.C. § 7123
(2006). Often, a relevant union intervenes as an interested party. E.g., Dep't of the
Treasury, 670 F.3d at 1315.
149E.g., 5 U.S.C. §§ 7104-7105.
150 Cf. SEC v. FLRA, 568 F.3d 990, 997-98 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (Kavanaugh, J., concurring)
(collecting cases).
151See 5 U.S.C. § 1214 (2006).
152 Auth. of the Special Counsel of the MSPB To Litigate & Submit Legislation to Cong., 8
Op. O.L.C. 30, 33-34 (1984).
153 Herz, supra note 5, at 897 n.16.
154 5 U.S.C. § 7703(d) (2006); see James v. Von Zemenszky, 284 F.3d 1310, 1314 (Fed. Cir.
2002); King v. Alston, 75 F.3d 657, 660 (Fed. Cir. 1996); Newman v. Lynch, 897 F.2d 1144,
1145-46 (Fed. Cir. 1990). In many of these cases, the employee was named as an additional
respondent. No other agency has this statutory authority. See 5 U.S.C. §§ 1204, 1214,
7703(a)(1) (2006); Dep't of Health & Human Serv. v. Bercier, 261 F. App'x 284, 284 (Fed.
Cir. 2008).

1246

GEORGIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 47:1217

employee were no longer contested. 155 The court found that it had
jurisdiction because OPM had a statutory right to appeal and had
standing because the Board's determination "is of vital interest to
OPM, which has administrative responsibility for personnel
practices and policies throughout most parts of government."'156 In
other words, the court concluded it had jurisdiction to resolve the
intrabranch dispute because (1) there was statutory authorization
for it and (2) one agency has an "interest" in how another agency
157
with final say on the issues interprets the law.
Other times, one agency's regulation of another is incidental to
a general regulatory mission. Where there is regulation, there is
an urge to litigate, either to enforce the penalty or to challenge it.
For instance, the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) asserted
the authority to impose penalties on other agencies for violations
of the Clean Air Act. 158 The Department of Justice concluded that
the EPA had the authority to issue penalties, but any dispute over
the fines could not be brought into litigation consistent with
Article III. 159 It based this on the DOJ's longstanding view that
courts lack jurisdiction over lawsuits when Executive Branch
60
agencies are the only real parties in interest.'

155 815 F.2d 668, 670-72 (Fed. Cir. 1987).

156Id. at 671.
157See id. It appears that Congress sought to provide the court with this power. See S.
Rep. No. 95-969, at 53 (1978) ("Mhe section establishes.., a means for OPM to appeal
Board decisions to court where the Board and the Director have substantial disagreements
about the proper interpretation or direction of the government's personnel laws."). A
similar conclusion was reached in EEOC v. USPS, 860 F.2d 372, 375 (10th Cir. 1988).
158 See Admin. Assessment of Civil Penalties Against Fed. Agencies Under the Clean Air
Act, 21 Op. O.L.C. 109 passim (1997).
159 See id.

160 See id.; see also Enforcement Jurisdiction of the Special Counsel for Immigration

Related Unfair Emp't Practices, 6 Op. O.L.C. 121, 129 (1992) ("Given that there is
ultimately but a single interest of the executive branch-that determined by the
President-litigation between two executive agencies would not appear to involve the
requisite adversity of interests to constitute a 'Case[ ]' or 'Controvers[y]' within the meaning
of Article III." (alterations in original)); Constitutionality of Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n's
Imposition of Civil Penalties on the Air Force, 13 Op. O.L.C. 131, 138-39 (1989); Proposed
Tax Assessment Against the USPS, 1 Op. O.L.C. 79, 80-82 (1977).
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A panel of the Eleventh Circuit disagreed, however, when the
Tennessee Valley Authority took the EPA to court. 16 1 The panel
formulated a two-part test, loosely based on Nixon: (1) "whether
the issue is traditionally justiciable" and (2) "whether the setting
162
of the dispute demonstrates true adversity between the parties."'
Applying this test, the court concluded that review of agency
decisions is a common function of courts, and TVA's independence
established the requisite adversity. 163 Although the opinion was
later withdrawn, the DOJ unsuccessfully petitioned the Supreme
164
Court to review the conclusion that this dispute was justiciable.
65
But the DOJ does not always oppose interagency litigation.
For example, the D.C. Circuit allowed the DOJ to challenge a
Federal Maritime Commission order exempting certain shippers
from antitrust laws. 166 The DOJ disagreed with the Commission's
exemption and challenged the decision based on its status as the
nation's enforcer of the antitrust laws. 167 In sum, the parties
disagreed about antitrust enforcement policies-nothing more. 68
The D.C. Circuit relied on Nixon to reject an argument that it
lacked jurisdiction, finding that the DOJ's role as the "traditional
advocate of antitrust policies in agency litigation" was enough to
give it standing, and "courts traditionally resolve" challenges to
final agency decisions. 69 In other cases, the D.C. Circuit has

161

TVA v. EPA, 278 F.3d 1184, 1197 (11th Cir. 2002), withdrawn, 336 F.3d 1236 (11th

Cir. 2003). The EPA, acting through the DOJ, also opposed TVA's litigation on the ground
that it violated an executive order and the DOJ's exclusive statutory authority to represent
the government.
162
163

Id.
Id.

164 Petition for a Writ of Certiorari at 19-23, No. 03-1662, EPA v. TVA, 2004 WL 304351,
at *19-23 (Feb. 13, 2004). The Supreme Court denied the petition. 541 U.S. 1030, 1030
(2004). In another case involving TVA, a court found that it lacked jurisdiction over 'IWA's
effort to bring an eminent domain proceeding against a federal agency. United States ex
rel. TVA v. Easement & Right of Way, 204 F. Supp. 837, 839 (E.D. Tenn. 1962).
165 See, e.g., United States v. Civil Aeronautics Bd., 511 F.2d 1315 (D.C. Cir. 1975)
(hearing case without addressing jurisdiction).
166 See United States v. FMC, 694 F.2d 793, 794-95 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (en banc) (per
curium) (reprinting panel opinion).
167 Id. at 810.
168 See id.
169

Id.
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heard challenges brought by the DOJ on behalf of the "United
States" (and other interested agencies) against decisions of the
Interstate Commerce Commission 170 and the Civil Aeronautics

Board. 171
The line of cases suggesting that a policy dispute suffices to
grant the executive a ticket into court was largely called into doubt
by a 1995 Supreme Court decision. 172 The Court rejected the
argument that the director of an agency with a disagreement
about a Benefits Review Board Board's decision was a "person
aggrieved" within the meaning of a statute authorizing judicial
review of such decisions. 7 3
Although formally a statutoryinterpretation decision, the Court made several observations with
constitutional undertones. Importantly, the Court distinguished
United States v. ICC, describing the United States' role in that
case as a market participant, perhaps even in "a nongovernmental
capacity," which "must be sharply distinguished from the status of
the Government as regulator or administrator."1 74 The Court
noted that interagency litigation to enforce a "policy interest"
would invoke the latter status-the government's interest as
regulator or administrator. The Court concluded, "To acknowledge
the general adequacy of such an interest would put the federal
courts into the regular business of deciding intrabranch and
intraagency policy disputes-a role that would be most
inappropriate."'1 75 Since 1995, the D.C. Circuit has adopted a
narrower construction of judicial-review statutes 76 and of agency
77
standing to challenge the actions of another agency.

170 United States v. ICC, 417 F. Supp. 851 (D.D.C. 1976), affd sub nom. Nat'l
Classification Comm. v. United States, 430 U.S. 961 (1977).
171 United States v. Civil Aeronautics Bd., 511 F.2d 1315, 1317-18 (D.C. Cir. 1975)
(hearing, without addressing jurisdiction, challenge brought by Departments of Justice and
Transportation to the Board's approval of anticompetitive agreements among airlines as
contrary to the "public interest").
172 OWCP v. Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co., 514 U.S. 122 (1995).
173 See id. at 125-30.
174 Id. at 128 & n.3.
175

Id. at 128-29.

E.g., Nat'l Ass'n of Sec. Dealers, Inc. v. SEC, 431 F.3d 803, 810 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
E.g., In re Sealed Case, 146 F.3d 1031, 1032 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (Silberman, J., concurring
in the denial of rehearing in banc).
176
177
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The final type of intrabranch litigation arguably occurs when a
federal employee or officer sues the government based on a matter
arising out of the performance of the officer's duties. Courts
routinely hear such disputes when the officer appears in a
personal capacity, such as when the officer alleges discrimination
that causes some adverse employment action. 178 In 1924, for
instance, a disbursing officer's salary was reduced by a deduction
ordered by the Comptroller General. The officer, understandably
unhappy at his reduced salary, brought a mandamus petition to
require the disbursing officer-himself-to pay him his full salary.
Although the court described the case as a "comic opera," noted the
"apparent absurdities," and made the obligatory reference to Dr.
Jekyll and Mr. Hyde, it ultimately rejected the government's
79
motion to dismiss and granted the requested mandamus.
In contrast, however, the courts are far less willing to entertain
a suit when the only injury alleged is to one's official capacity. For
example, an employee of the Department of State sued his
employer on the theory that the appointment of a senator to be
Secretary of State violated the Constitution, and that he was
suffering an injury by being required to follow orders that derived
from unconstitutionally appointed leadership. The court had little
difficulty dismissing the employee's claim as nonjusticiable 8 0
D. WHAT DOES IT ALL MEAN?

Courts and commentators have proposed several theories for
squaring these cases with the general proposition that no entity
can sue itself. But each offered rationale has limitations that
prevent it from satisfying.
1. Presence of a Real Party in Interest. One possibility is that
behind the caption in each case is a private party as the real party

178 See Kelley, supra note 4, at 1213 (explaining significance of officer appearing in
personal versus official capacity).
1v9Wylly v. McCarl, 2 F.2d 897 (D. Mass. 1924), affd, 5 F.2d 964, 965 (1st Cir. 1925)
(emphasizing that the Comptroller General was also a named respondent).
180 Rodearmel v. Clinton, 666 F. Supp. 2d 123, 131 (D.D.C. 2009), appeal dismissed for
lack ofjurisdiction, 130 S. Ct. 3384 (2010).
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in interest.18 1 The Court's decision in United States v. ICC,
emphasized the presence of private railroads, "the real parties in
interest."'18 2 But the facts and holdings of many cases do not fit
neatly (if at all) within this paradigm. 8 3
Although some
commentators have described United States v. Nixon as a suit
against "President Nixon in his private capacity,"' 8 4 this does not
seem to have been the way the Supreme Court viewed the case.
Moreover, this explanation loses much of its force when one
considers that the dispute in that case was the propriety of
President Nixon's invocation of the Executive Privilege-a
constitutionally grounded privilege that attaches only to the
85
Executive Branch.1
The real-party-in-interest rationale also succumbs to a more
fundamental problem. Why should the interests of an absent
private party be litigated by nonadverse parties? Indeed, that
some absent party's interests are being adjudicated is an
argument against justiciability. 8 6
Instead, judicial resolution
should wait until the outside party can participate, lest that party
be prejudiced by an adverse precedent obtained through litigation
missing an outside perspective.
2. Presence of an Independent Agency. Another popular
explanation is that litigation is permissible only when one of the
parties is an "independent agency" that does not answer directly to
the President.'8 7 The usual definition of "independent agency" is

'l8
See Constitutionality of Nuclear Regulatory Comm'n's Imposition of Civil Penalties on
the Air Force, 13 Op. O.L.C. 131, 139-41 (1989); Herz, supranote 5, at 940-46.
182 United States v. ICC, 337 U.S. 427, 432 (1949).
183 See Herz, supra note 5, at 941-44.
18 13 Op. O.L.C. at 141; Herz, supra note 5, at 971 n.300.
185 See Herz, supra note 5, at 971 n.300. Herz nevertheless observes that the President
"was a member of the regulated community, subject to the ordinary evidence-gathering
regime of the criminal law," and was involved in that capacity rather than as the elected
head of a branch of government. Id.
18 See id. at 945 (arguing that this approach is "perverse" and "[i]f the United States
actually has a dispute with a private party, then perhaps the Constitution requires it to
litigate against that party rather than against itself').
187 SEC v. FLRA, 568 F.3d 990, 997-98 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (Kavanaugh, J., concurring); 13B
CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 3531.11 n.6 (3d ed.

2008); Kelley, supra note 4, at 1213-14; cf. Note, Inter-Agency Legal Disputes, supra note 4,
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one with a head that is insulated by statute from removal by the
President, usually absent some showing of good cause. 18 8 These
agencies are then thought to be more independent of the rest of the
Executive Branch, because they can pursue their regulatory
agenda with a measure of freedom.
Litigation involving independent agencies is, at least formally,
more adverse than litigation solely between components directly
answerable to the President. The leadership of the independent
agency has the formal ability to go "rogue" and resist the general
policies of the President without risking immediate removal. But,
despite this formal independence, political and administrative
pressures keep independent agencies in check.18 9 Moreover, even
pure Executive Branch agencies have some practical measure of
independence that rivals the formal independence of independent
The practical difference between executive and
agencies. 190
independent agencies may be more illusionary than real.
A bigger problem is that the mere presence of an independent
agency has not been held to be a necessary or sufficient
requirement in any of the cases. It is true that independent
agencies are, as a practical matter, more likely to be involved in
interagency litigation, and many (although not all I 91) of the cases
where agencies have been adverse involved an independent
agency. But it would be a mistake to treat a practical prerequisite
as a constitutionally sufficient condition to suit.
Even if independent agencies have a degree of formal
autonomy, justiciability problems remain. As discussed further
below, one fundamental flaw with interagency disputes over
at 1595-96 (arguing that even agencies under the direct control of the President should be
permitted to litigate against each other).
188 See Free Enter. Fund v. Public Co. Accounting Oversight Bd., 130 S. Ct. 3138, 3153
(2010); Herz, supra note 5, at 952.
189 Herz, supranote 5, at 952-53.
190Id. at 952-54 (arguing that the difference between independent agencies and executive
branch agencies "looks bigger than it is"). Empirical research also indicates that agency
structure depends on factors such as the President's popularity, the strength of the
congressional majority, and whether the President and Congress are of the same party. See
DAVID E. LEWIS, PRESIDENTS AND THE POLITICS OF AGENCY DESIGN 58-69 (2003).
19, E.g., TVA v. EPA, 278 F.3d 1184, 1197 (11th Cir. 2002), withdrawn, 336 F.3d 1236

(11th Cir. 2003).
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regulatory policy is that both agencies rely on the same interestthat of the United States. This reasoning applies equally to
independent agencies. Even if they are adverse in the sense that
their disagreements cannot be resolved administratively, they are
still just competing voices of the same government.
3. The Nixon Test. Several courts interpret United States v.
Nixon as setting forth a two-part test: (1) "whether the issue is
traditionally justiciable" and (2) "whether the setting of the
dispute demonstrates true adversity between the parties."192 The
most jurisdiction-friendly decisions apply this test and find
jurisdiction even in regulatory or policy squabbles between
agencies.193 But this test is based on a misreading of Nixon and
cannot be squared with basic principles of justiciability.
To begin, the Supreme Court never actually articulated this
"test." The Court never, for instance, described any aspect of the
test as necessary or sufficient to justify federal court jurisdiction.
Rather, the Court pointed to several features that were enough
under the facts of the case to create a justiciable controversy. But
many of these (such as the fact that the case was ancillary to "a
federal criminal prosecution," which clearly involves a private
litigant adverse to the government) failed to make it into the test's
194
formulation.
Moreover, the test relies on a functionalist approach to
justiciability that has been severely eroded at best-or, more
likely, outright rejected-by subsequent Supreme Court case
law.195 Lujan and its progeny do not ask whether the totality of

192

TVA v. EPA, 278 F.3d at 1197; see also Steinberg, supra note 4, at 337.

193 E.g., TVA v. EPA, 278 F.3d at 1197.

See Nixon, 418 U.S. at 697.
195 See Hein v. Freedom From Religion Found., Inc., 551 U.S. 587, 611 (2007) (plurality
opinion) ("By framing the standing question solely in terms of whether the dispute would be
presented in an adversary context and in a form traditionally viewed as capable of judicial
resolution, Fast 'failed to recognize that this doctrine has a separation-of-powers
component, which keeps courts within certain traditional bounds vis-A-vis the other
branches, concrete adverseness or not.'" (quoting Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 353 n.3
(1996))); Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of Church and State,
Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 471 (1982) ("The requirements of Art. III are not satisfied merely
because a party requests a court of the United States to declare its legal rights, and has
194
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the circumstances support jurisdiction. Rather, they insist that
litigants show a particular type of injury that the courts can
remedy in a particular way.
The difficulty with the functional approach to Nixon is
underscored by the illusory nature of the test in practice. Even
though the Nixon Court justified jurisdiction by emphasizing the
"uniqueness of the setting" and the "unique facts of this case," the
test gleaned from that case would virtually always support
jurisdiction. For the first part of the test, courts ask whether a
particular controversy is justiciable by considering the nature of
legal questions raised. But this "misses the point." 19 6 Framed this
way, courts will inevitably conclude that the traditional role of
The judiciary is
courts is to decide questions of law. 19 7
undoubtedly the final arbiter of constitutional meaning, but this
does not give it a license to consider constitutional questions
absent a live case. The more relevant inquiry considers the
manner in which the question is presented and asks whether the
nature of the proceeding and the parties involved is "of the sort
19 8
traditionally... resolved by, the judicial process."
The second prong of the test-whether the setting demonstrates
sufficient adverseness-is also illusory in practice. By definition,
if the court is asked to resolve a question, some adverseness exists,
even if it is feigned. But this is hardly enough to justify standing
under modern law. 199 Nor should courts simply take the word of
the parties that they are at odds. Given the way in which the
Nixon test can be and has been manipulated to support
unwarranted exercises of judicial power, if ever there were an

couched that request for forms of relief historically associated with courts of law in terms
that have a familiar ring to those trained in the legal process.").
196 Herz, supra note 5, at 969.
197 See United States v. FMC, 694 F.2d 793, 810 (1982) (en banc) (per curium) ("This
setting
and the
resolve
traditionally
that
courts
dispute... raises issues
assures ... concrete adverseness." (reprinting original panel opinion)).
198 Vt. Agency of Natural Res. v. United States ex rel. Stevens, 529 U.S. 765, 774 (2000)
(quoting Steel Co. v. Citizens for a Better Env't, 523 U.S. 83, 102 (1998)) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
199See generally Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555 (1992).
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example to justify the Court's recent turn towards rigid rules of
justiciability, the manipulable and meaningless Nixon test is it.
4. Herz's Test. The final possible rule comes from Professor
Herz, who criticizes each of these justifications for intrabranch
litigation. 200
Rejecting each, he believes that any effort to
articulate an Article III limit on agency litigation is doomed. 20 1 In
Herz's view, it is "absurdly formalistic" to describe the United
States as "one person as a litigant" in light of the varied interests
of the government. 20 2
Instead, Herz argues, "if an
intragovernmental dispute has actually reached the courts, that
very fact indicates that there is concrete adversity sufficient to
satisfy article III."203 Herz does express reservations motivated by
concerns over presidential (rather than judicial) power if certain
types of policy disputes spill over into courts. Although I agree
that Article II may be relevant to the inquiry, I take up Herz's
implicit challenge to defend the role of Article III in such matters,
with the benefit of an additional two decades of case law and
204
scholarship.
5. A Different View. Each approach to interagency litigation
offered so far-a real party in interest, the presence of an
independent agency, the Nixon test, and the Herz approach-is
unsatisfying.
Instead, I propose that the justiciability of
interagency litigation depends on whether the interests asserted
by the competing parties are sovereign or proprietary. 20 5 Although
disputes between agencies asserting proprietary injuries are
Herz, supra note 5, at 941-55, 969-70.
See id. at 971, 990.
202 Id. at 906; cf. Albert & Simon, supra note 4, at 549 (arguing that, because the Court
has approved of independent agencies, "it is implausible to view article II as a general bar
against adjudication of legal disputes" within the Executive Branch).
203 Herz, supra note 5, at 898.
204 See also Kelley, supra note 4, at 1213.
205 13B WRIGHT ET AL., supra note 187, § 3531.11 ("For some purposes, it is convenient to
approach the standing of the United States by distinguishing sovereign, proprietary, quasisovereign, and private interests."); Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 119 n.5 (1968) (Harlan, J.,
dissenting) (marking "the distinction between the personal and proprietary interests of the
traditional plaintiff, and the representative and public interests of the plaintiff in a public
action. I am aware that we are confronted here by a spectrum of interests of varying
intensities, but the distinction is sufficiently accurate, and convenient, to warrant its use at
least for purposes of discussion.").
200
201
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justiciable, there is no controversy when both sides rely on a
sovereign interest.
The distinction between sovereign and proprietary harms is
used in several analogous settings, 2 6 including the interpretation
of judicial-review statutes, 20 7 the early Supreme Court's approach
to state standing, 20 8 and generally follows the modern approach to
foreign-state sovereign immunity.20 9 And, as explained in the
following sections, the difference between an agency's interest as
regulator and as the regulated is relevant to standing. If both
sides assert an interest as a sovereign-an interest in enforcing
the law or regulating third parties-then both sides are asserting
the same interest, and there is no controversy. 2 10 However, if at
least one agency appears in a proprietary or commercial capacityas a market participant or a regulated entity-then there can be a
211
justiciable dispute.
Permitting interagency disputes when one side acts in a
nonregulatory capacity is consistent with the vast majority of the
cases, including the Supreme Court decisions. For example, the
Postmaster General asserted a proprietary injury against a
nonpaying deputy who was effectively stealing money from the

206

See, e.g., Bldg. & Const. Trades Council of Metro. Dist. v. Associated Builders &

Contractors of Mass., 507 U.S. 218, 227 (1993) (distinguishing, for purposes of National
Labor Relations Act preemption, between "government as regulator and government as
proprietor").
207 See, e.g., Nat'l Ass'n of Sec. Dealers, Inc. v. SEC, 431 F.3d 803, 810-12 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
208 See Pennsylvania v. Wheeling & Belmont Bridge Co., 54 U.S. 518, 559-60 (1851)
(distinguishing between proprietary, sovereign, and quasi-sovereign interests for purposes
of state standing); Wolhandler & Collins, supra note 210, at 413-18 (same); Katherine
Mims Crocker, Note, Securing Sovereign State Standing, 97 VA. L. REV. 2051, 2056-56
(2011) (same).
209 See Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-583, 90 Stat. 2891
(codified in scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.) (enumerating exceptions to foreign sovereign
immunity, including exceptions for commercial activities, certain torts, and takings of
property in violation of international law).
210 Woolhandler & Collins, supra note 51, at 410. One might also point out that the
government can assert quasi-sovereign interests, basically representing the interests of its
citizenry. For purposes of this Article, I treat these as purely sovereign interests.
211 Cf. Cotton v. United States, 52 U.S. 229, 231 (1850) ("But the powers of the United
States as a sovereign, dealing with offenders against their laws, must not be confounded
with their rights as a body politic.").
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United States. 212 In United States v. ICC, the Army appeared as a
purchaser of a service that was unhappy with the rate the
railroads charged with the approval of another agency.2 13

The

agencies that challenge a mandate of the FLRA or the MSPB
suffer a plainly proprietary injury in their capacities as
employers. 214 Because the regulated agency is in a similar
situation to any private regulated company, it can easily meet the
traditional elements of standing based on its proprietary interest.
In contrast, the Supreme Court correctly rejected both the
Attorney General's suit against the Secretary of War in Hayburn's
Case215 and the Secretary of Labor's challenge to the decision of
the Benefits Review Board in Newport News. 216 Although the
Court's reasons for rejecting the Attorney General's suit in
Hayburn's Case are unknown, the Court's most recent
pronouncement in Newport News expressly rejected the prospect of
an agency asserting a policy interest against another agency. In
fact, the Newport News Court articulated the very distinction
between sovereign and proprietary interests used here: the
distinction between the government's proprietary injuries, which
"must be sharply distinguished from the status of the Government
as regulator or administrator."

' 21 7

This divide between sovereign and proprietary interests is also
supported by analogy to the Supreme Court's decisions on whether
a state can sue itself in federal court. 218 In 2011, the Supreme
Court permitted one state agency to sue other state officials who
refused to provide records to the agency as part of the agency's
investigation on behalf of individuals with disabilities in the
state. 219 The Court did not mention Article III but instead held

See supra notes 90-93 and accompanying text.
See supra notes 107-16 and accompanying text.
214 See supra notes 147-53 and accompanying text.
215 See supra notes 57-65 and accompanying text.
216 OWCP v. Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co., 514 U.S. 122 (1995).
217 Id. at 128 & n.3.
218 See generally 13B WRIGHT ETAL., supra note 187, § 3531.11.1.
219 Va. Office for Prot. & Advocacy v. Stewart, 131 S. Ct. 1632, 1637-38 (2011); see also
Ind. Prot. & Advocacy Servs. v. Ind. Family & Soc. Serv. Admin., 603 F.3d 365, 370-74 (7th
Cir. 2010) (en banc).
212
213
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that Congress could validly abrogate sovereign immunity even for
an intrastate contest. 220 In earlier decisions, the Court routinely
rejected constitutional challenges by state subdivisions when they
asserted "public"-distinguished from "private"-rights against
their own state. 221 Although these decisions could be viewed as
interpretations of the relevant constitutional provisions, some
lower courts have suggested these decisions may imply a limit on
222
standing for a state to sue itself.
Admittedly, some lower court decisions do not track the
distinction between sovereign
and proprietary
interests
perfectly. 223 Most problematic are the D.C. Circuit's decisions that
allowed the DOJ to sue the Federal Maritime Commission and
others over policy disagreements. 224 These decisions were wrongly
decided and have been severely undercut by subsequent
developments, including the Supreme Court's decision in Newport
News and the restriction of standing in general. In fact, they have
225
not been followed even in the D.C. Circuit.
Some have criticized the distinction between the government's
sovereign and proprietary capacities as incoherent. 226 But it has

Stewart, 131 S. Ct. at 1638.
See Rogers v. Brockette, 588 F.2d 1057, 1069-70 (5th Cir. 1979) (collecting cases).
222 See Virginia v. Reinhard, 568 F.3d 110, 122-23 (4th Cir. 2009), rev'd sub nom. Vt.
Office for Prot. & Advocacy v. Stewart, 131 S. Ct. 1632 (2011); City of South Lake Tahoe v.
Cal. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency, 625 F.2d 231, 232-34 (9th Cir. 1980); see also Illinois v.
City of Chicago, 137 F.3d 474, 476-77 (7th Cir. 1998).
223 There is also a series of cases where interagency disputes over property-the
quintessential proprietary injury-were rejected by courts as improper interagency
litigation. See supra note 139. Although at first blush, these cases would seem to be
inconsistent with the divide proposed here, as explained below, they can be explained by the
doctrine of sovereign immunity, rather than from Article III's case or controversy
requirements. If Congress were to authorize agencies to sue each other over allocation of
money, this would not necessarily implicate Article III limits, but it could raise serious
concerns under the Appropriations Clause and the political accountability implicit in the
purpose of the Clause. See generally Kate Stith, Congress'Power of the Purse,97 YALE L.J.
1343 (1988).
224 This decision is even criticized by Herz. Herz, supranote 5, at 970-71.
225 Nat'l Ass'n of Sec. Dealers, Inc. v. SEC, 431 F.3d 803, 810 (D.C. Cir. 2005).
226 Grove, supra note 41, at 805 n.103 ("I do not claim that this distinction between
'sovereign' and 'proprietary' interests is necessarily coherent."); Herz, supra note 5, at 962
("The concrete line drawing difficulties that plague its application are a symptom of this
conceptual difficulty.").
220

221

1258

GEORGIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 47:1217

proven workable when used in parallel contexts. Indeed, its
intuitive appeal explains why it continues to resurface despite its
critics. Even if there are some difficult calls at the margins, it is
unlikely that the distinction will cause any greater trouble for
courts than the standing doctrine more generally or interagency
litigation in particular.
IV. THE NEED FOR A NONSOVEREIGN INTEREST To SATISFY

ARTICLE III
Although the courts have largely rejected litigation between
agencies raising sovereign interests and allowed agencies to fight
over proprietary injuries, the rationales (if any) actually offered by
the deciding courts have not been clear. In fact, prohibiting courts
from hearing agency disputes over sovereign functions is well
supported by general principles of standing and Article III. When
an agency is regulated in its commercial dealings, it suffers harm
in its corporate capacity and can properly assert this interest
against another agency. But the sovereign is the United States,
and while agencies may be designated to act on behalf of the
United States, sovereign interests belong to the United States and
cannot appear on both sides of a dispute.
To illustrate the justiciability problems of certain types of
interagency litigation, consider a stylized version of United States
2 27
(through the DOJ) versus Federal Maritime Commission (FMC).
Both agencies play a role in antitrust laws: the DOJ through
enforcement and the FMC through granting exceptions to certain
classes of carriers when the public interest warrants it. The
parties, however, dispute whether shippers should be given a
license to engage in anticompetitive behavior that otherwise would
violate the antitrust laws. The FMC, which happens to be an
independent agency with independent litigating authority, passes
a regulation granting a broad exemption to every shipper. The
DOJ disagrees with the FMC's assessment of what the public
interest requires and, further, believes it has identified procedural

227

See United States v. FMC, 694 F.2d 793 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (en banc) (per curium).
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defects in the FMC's regulation, so it takes advantage of a
statutory provision explicitly permitting the DOJ to challenge any
order of the FMC in court.
The lack of any private party is fatal to this suit. Because the
DOJ and the FMC both are asserting the sovereign interests of the
United States, they lack standing to sue each other. Moreover, the
identified dangers of a nonadverse suit, including a failure of
advocacy and a lack of facts, are alive and well in the context of
such intragovernment litigation, which further counsels against
jurisdiction over these matters.
Here, I draw a distinction between the interests of the United
States and the interests of a particular agency. I argue that
sovereign interests belong to the United States alone. In contrast,
agencies are simply legal personalities and can experience the
same proprietary injuries as any other ongoing concern. When an
agency faces injury-some proprietary harm-there can be a
justiciable controversy. But when both plaintiff and defendant
rely on sovereign interests, they both appear as representatives of
the United States. And a single-party case is no case at all.
Alternatively, if expressed as a matter of standing, the United
States lacks any cognizable interest in reversing itself.
A. THE MANY INTERESTS OF THE SINGULAR UNITED STATES

1. The Difference Between the Interests of the "United States"
and the Interests of an Agency or of an Officeholder. The
distinction between sovereign and proprietary injuries does not
usually matter much when the federal government is the plaintiff.
Challenges to the government's standing in suits against private
parties are generally rare and ill-fated. But as I argued above, the
distinction between sovereign and proprietary injuries does have
meaning in interagency litigation.
An agency can suffer a
proprietary injury and seek relief for this injury even against
another agency. However, only the United States experiences a
sovereign injury, and the United States cannot assert a sovereign
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injury against itself.228 Thus, there is a meaningful difference for
purposes of interagency litigation between the proprietary
interests of an agency and the sovereign interests of the United
States. 229 One must look behind the designation of the parties on
the pleadings to determine whether the agency is actually
asserting an injury to itself (a proprietary injury) or to the United
States (a sovereign injury).
There is but one federal sovereign-the United States. Its
interests include ensuring the proper interpretation and
application of its laws as well as the protection of its citizens, but
this list is hardly exhaustive. 230 The United States cannot speak
but through its agents-its many officers and institutions-who
declare and defend its sovereign interests. Thus, when Congress
vests an agency with the power to implement the United States'
interests, it can also designate an agency or officer to represent its
interests in court. 231 When an agency sues to enforce its view of
the public interest or defend a regulation it promulgated, it is
relying on nothing less than the sovereign power of the United
States: the United States' interest as regulator. 23 2 It is, of course,
true that the articulation of the sovereign's interest depends on
who is speaking; thus, the DOJ and the FMC, may disagree over
the view of the United States in any particular matter. This

228 See Gilles, supra note 54, at 344, 353-54 (arguing that, by analogy to private law
litigation, sovereign "injuries are 'personal' to the government" and "claims seeking to
vindicate the government's non-proprietary, sovereign interests are not assignable" but may
be enforced through agents).
229 Courts have at times drawn a distinction between the interests of the United States
and that of an agency, but it usually tracks designation rather than the nature of the injury
asserted. See, e.g., In re Sealed Case, 146 F.3d 1031, 1031-32 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (Silberman,
J., concurring in denial of rehearing in banc); United States v. Alky Enters., Inc., 969 F.2d
1309, 1315 (1st Cir. 1992); Marshall v. Gibson's Prods., Inc., 584 F.2d 668, 676 (5th Cir.
1978); Senate Select Comm. on Presidential Campaign Activities v. Nixon, 366 F. Supp. 51,
56 (D.D.C. 1973).
230 See Nina A. Mendelson, Disclosing "Political"Oversight of Agency Decision Making,
108 MICH. L. REV. 1127, 1144 (2010) (noting that "public interest" could be defined in a
number of ways).
231 See ICC v. Oregon-Washington R.R. & Navigation Co., 288 U.S. 14, 27 (1933).
232 See Gilles, supra note 54, at 353-54.
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disagreement, however, does not alter the fact that they are both,
233
at their core, asserting the position of the United States.
Other times an agency relies on some harm to itself as a quasicorporate entity. This often occurs when it is regulated by another
agency. These injuries are directly analogous to those suffered by
wholly nongovernmental entities. For example, an agency's hiring
practices may be rejected by another agency, or its ownership of
certain property may be scrutinized. 234 These regulations pertain
to the agency's structure, and they implicate interests with ready
analogues to the common law interests of private corporations.
True, such regulations may have an indirect and incidental effect
on the agency's furtherance of its sovereign mission (by, for
example, imposing an administrative burden). But these rules
primarily injure the agency in the same manner as they would
injure a private corporation. Even in the 1800s, the Supreme
Court carefully distinguished between actions by an agency
asserting a common law injury and those asserting "the powers of
235
the United States as a sovereign" to enforce its laws.
The same analysis applies with equal force to defendant
standing. Although usually we do not think of defendants as
having standing, Professor Hall convincingly demonstrates that
this is because it is virtually always satisfied and thus "[h]ides in
[p]lain [s]ight." 236 Standing's redressability requirement ensures
that defendants are also interested parties. 237 Similarly, the
requirement of concrete adverseness contemplates that defendants

233

Id.

234 See 5 U.S.C. §§ 7105(a)(2)(G), 7116, 7118 (2006) (granting the FLRA the authority to
resolve issues relating to an agency's unfair labor practices, which includes an examination
of its hiring practices); 40 U.S.C. § 521 (2006) (giving the General Services Administration
the authority to determine what to do with "excess" property, including to transfer it to
other federal agencies).
235 E.g., Cotton v. United States, 52 U.S. 229, 231 (1850); accord Post Master Gen. of U.S.
v. Early, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 136, 145-46 (1827).
236 See Hall, supra note 9, at 1552.
237 See id. at 1551-52 ("Any defendant against whom relief is sought will always have
standing to defend, because the exposure to risk of injury from an adverse judgment is a
sufficient personal stake to satisfy Article III.").
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have different interests at stake in the litigation than plaintiffs. 238
Recognizing this, determining whether the interest that the
interagency-litigation defendant asserts is sovereign or proprietary
is simple: When it is defending a regulation or order that it issued,
it is sovereign; if not, it is proprietary.
Because agencies may assert an injury as an agency or as a
delegee of the United States' interests, we must follow the
Supreme Court's instruction to "look behind names that symbolize
the parties to determine whether a justiciable case or controversy
is presented." 239 This can be done by looking at the nature of the
injury asserted. When an agency appears as a market participant
adverse to a regulator, it asserts a common law injury no different
from any private corporation's-paying out money or retaining an
employee it would rather discharge. 240 But when it asserts an
injury as a regulator-a policy interest or an interest in a
particular interpretation of law-it asserts a sovereign interest
divorced from any particular common law harm to the agency
itself. This injury would not suffice for a private corporation, and
the only plausible basis for the agency's standing is that it appears
241
in the shoes of the United States.
2. The Government Has No Sovereign Interest in Reversing
Itself. Courts rarely find that agencies lack standing to assert
sovereign interests.
But they will do so when an agency
challenges the regulatory decision of another agency based on a
mere policy interest rather than a direct harm. 242 For instance,
the Supreme Court concluded that the Director of the Office of
Workers' Compensation Programs could not challenge in court a
decision of the Benefits Review Board, rejecting the Director's
238

See id. at 1551 ("Article III ensures that the federal courts resolve only legal questions

that 'emerge[ ] precisely framed and necessary for decision from a class of adversary
argument... embracing conflicting and demanding interests.'" (alterations in original)
(quoting Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 96-97 (1968))).
239 United States v. ICC, 337 U.S. 426, 430 (1949); cf. In re Sealed Case, 146 F.3d 1031,
1031-32 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (Silberman, J., concurring in the denial of rehearing in banc).
240 See, e.g., Cotton, 52 U.S. at 231.
241 See Gilles, supra note 228, at 353-54.
242 See S&E Contractors, Inc. v. United States, 406 U.S. 1, 12 (1972) (finding that the
Department of Justice lacks standing "to overturn decisions of coordinate offices of the
Executive Department"); cf. Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 829-30 (1997).
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argument that she was attempting to vindicate the public interest
and the programmatic interests of her agency. 243 The Court
(through Justice Scalia) "sharply distinguished" between "the
status of the Government as a statutory beneficiary or market
participant" and "the status of the Government as regulator or
administrator," the latter lacking the authority to challenge other
agencies in Court. 244 Although formally concerned with the
construction of the statute authorizing appeals, 245 the Court relied
on this distinction in explaining its reluctance to permitting an
agency to rely on a policy interest to challenge another's decision
in court. 246 The reasoning behind this distinction tracks closely
the argument that I make here.
Plainly, a policy interest is enough to establish an agency's
Article III standing to sue a private party. That this standing
evaporates when the defendant is another agency suggests a
denial of the challenging agency's right to assert the United States'
sovereign interests. 247 This is because the United States has no
sovereign interest in proceeding against itself, like it does against
another, 248 to ensure its vision of the public interest or
interpretation of the law is realized. It has no interest in reversing
itself. Consequently, no agency-as one of many duly empowered
agents articulating and advocating for the United States'

OWCP v. Newport News Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co., 514 U.S. 122, 130 (1995).
Id. at 128.
245 See id. at 125. But see Illinois v. Chicago, 137 F.3d 474, 476 (7th Cir. 1998) (relying on
Newport News for broader constitutional lesson).
246 Newport News, 514 U.S. at 128-29. It is true that the Newport News Court said some
broader things that might question whether agencies generally have standing to enforce the
public interest. See id. at 132 ("Agencies do not automatically have standing to sue for actions
that frustrate the purposes of their statutes."). But it would be remarkable if so unknown an
opinion silently called into doubt the settled holdings of 150 years of jurisprudence. Moreover,
such unnecessarily broad language can be explained by considering its context-a statute that
the Court interpreted to deny the agency a right to sue under those circumstancessuggesting Congress has some ability to limit by statute the Executive Branch's litigating
options when it comes to the public interest. Id. at 131-33.
247 See S&E Contractors,406 U.S. at 13.
248 However, I concede that the United States can proceed against an agency that is
asserting a proprietary interest, because the defendant agency is not the United States.
The United States has no interest in reversing itself, but that is not to deny the United
States' valid interest in enforcing federal law against its agencies.
243

244
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sovereign interests-can have an interest in adjudicating a claim
that amounts to simply rejecting another duly empowered agent's
view of those same interests. An agency, like private litigants, can
no longer obtain Article III standing based on an undifferentiated
interest in seeing the law enforced in a particular way when the
agency sues the United States (or one of its officers or
institutions); it must instead point to whatever common law harm
that the agency experiences.
Not only does it make sense that the United States lacks an
interest in reversing itself, but when both parties in a dispute rely
on the same interest, there cannot be a case or controversy. An
agency that wants to impose its interpretation of law so that it can
regulate as it sees fit relies on its piece of the sovereign interest.
And the same interest is implicated when an agency appears in
court as a defendant to defend its policy decisions. 249 Neither the
plaintiff nor defendant agency in such a case has a constitutionally
cognizable injury, so to satisfy standing's injury requirement, each
must rely on an injury to the sovereign interest of the "United
States"-namely, with its vision of the law or public interest.
Intuitively, when both plaintiff and defendant rely on this same
sovereign interest to establish an injury, there is no justiciable
controversy. 250 As the Supreme Court has said, there is but "one
251
'United States' that may appear before" the courts.
3. Response to Objections.
This distinction between the
interests of an agency and the United States may be fairly
criticized. One might argue that I have drawn a formalist line
between the interests of the United States and the agencies,
thereby overlooking the legitimate interests that agencies have in
implementing their vision of the public interest over the objections
See supra notes 236-38.
Cf. Herz, supra note 5, at 971 ("In the article III context, however, the
regulating/regulated distinction rests as much on intuition as argument, a feeling that two
agencies truly are part of the same person when both are acting in their regulatory
capacities.").
251 United States v. Providence Journal Co., 485 U.S. 693, 701 (finding "startling' the
suggestion that "there is more than one 'nited States' that may appear before this Court,
and that the United States is something other than the sovereign composed of the three
branches" (internal quotation marks omitted)).
249
250
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of another agency. But my distinction is not simply a formalist
linguistic trick; instead, it reveals a deeper point. By considering
why agencies might disagree, we can see why their competing
claims to the mantle of the United States cannot establish their
standing.
First, agencies might disagree due to differences in personnel.
In this type of dispute, a court is effectively asked to decide a war
waged between bureaucrats. If government officials, by virtue of
their office, could obtain standing, then the courts would provide a
forum to resolve competing visions of the law among members of
the bureaucracy (who already have broad power to set policy) but
not among members of the electorate. 252 The Supreme Court has
rejected the standing of federal officials when baldly premised on
an official interest. 253 It serves little purpose to disallow the
standing of individual officials but to allow them to accomplish the
same goal when directing a federal agency.
Another potential reason for agency disagreement is the scope
of their mandate. Some agencies have extremely narrow interests.
For example, the Small Business Administration (which has no
regulatory authority) must myopically consider only the interests
of certain businesses. 254 Generally, however, agency mandates are
not so narrow but require an agency to assess the "public interest"
and "reasonableness."255 Yet even mandates to consider general
interests are likely to be skewed over time by institutional
biases. 256 An agency's enforcement mission may cloud its ability to
252 John G. Roberts, Jr., Article IIILimits on Statutory Standing, 42 DUKE L.J. 1219, 1232
(1993).
253 See Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 821, 829-30 (1997); Arizonans for Official English v.
Arizona, 520 U.S. 43, 65 (1997); accord Rodearmel v. Clinton, 666 F. Supp. 2d 123, 129
(D.D.C. 2009).
254 Leah Chan Grinvald, Resolving the IP Disconnect for Small Businesses, 95 MARQ. L.
REV. 1491, 1502 n.52 (2012) ("The U.S. Small Business Administration (SBA) was created
in 1953 as an independent agency of the federal government to aid, counsel, assist and
protect the interests of small business concerns...." (quoting Mission Statement, U.S.
SMALL Bus. ADMIN., http://www.sba.gov/content/mission-statement-0 (last visited June 8,
2012))).
255 See, e.g., Mendelson, supra note 230, at 1135-36 (citing examples).
256 Rachel E. Barkow, Insulating Agencies: Avoiding Capture Through Institutional
Design, 89 TEX. L. REV. 15, 22-23 (2010); Eric Biber, Too Many Things To Do: How To Deal
with the Dysfunctions of Multiple-GoalAgencies, 33 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 7 (2009).
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pass a regulation that fairly considers the interests of regulated
parties, 25 7 or (more likely) an agency's power to promote
development will co-opt its mission to regulate for safety. 258 Or
perhaps one agency has greater contact with a particular industry
and thus is more susceptible to be "captured" by the industry's
focused lobbying. 25 9 Still further, even without a good reason, an
agency might simply evolve divergent ideological cultures over
time. 260
Congress, arguably aware of these biases when it
legislates, may select the agency to which it provides regulatory
power with these biases in mind. 261 Therefore, agencies may
represent divergent interests based on congressional intent, either
explicit (through a narrow statutory mandate) or implicit (through
the delegation of power to an agency with a policy bias). As
Professor Jaffe wrote, the United States
may, in the carnival of the public interest, appear in
many guises in which if one looks he may see-without
too much effort-twitching behind the august
lineaments of the ICC, the Department of Agriculture,
and the Secretary of the Interior, the eager grimaces of
262
railroad, farmer, and rural electrifier.
Although these representational interests may indicate that
agencies are truly antagonistic to one another, this does not
establish that the agency has an injury to itself that is distinct
from that of the sovereign.
The mere fact of divergent
institutional interests within an organization is not sufficient to
permit a suit. A corporation's general counsel and head of

259

See Biber, supra note 256, at 32.
Barkow, supra note 256, at 50-51.
See generally id.

260

Cf. id. at 49.

257
258

Cf. Antonin Scalia, Judicial Deference to Administrative Interpretationsof Law, 1989
DUKE L.J. 511, 517 (praising Chevron because "Congress now knows that the ambiguities it
creates, whether intentionally or unintentionally, will be resolved, within the bounds of
permissible interpretation, not by the courts but by a particular agency, whose policy biases
will ordinarily be known").
262 Jaffe, supra note 4, at 300.
261
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marketing may often clash as each focuses on different interests,
but they still may not sue each other to work those differences out.
Further, to the extent that an agency purports to sue for private
interests in a pseudo-representational capacity, it is better for
those interests to be represented directly by those whose interests
are at stake. 263
However interested an agency may be in
promoting only a particular slice of the public welfare (whether
based on statutory mandate, capture, or culture), it may fail to
accurately identify the interests it is meant to protect. 264 And, in
any event, not even a sovereign can assert the broad interests of
265
the citizenry against the United States.
A final objection to my distinction between agency and
sovereign interests could be that agencies have an interest in
preserving their regulatory power independent of the sovereign
interests of the United States. 266 Thus, an alternative way of
looking at interagency litigation is that the agencies are simply
asking the courts to decide which agency has the power to
determine the regulatory issue. Both want to act in some shared
263 See Herz, supra note 5, at 945 (arguing that representational standing is "perverse"
and "If the United States actually has a dispute with a private party, then perhaps the
Constitution requires it to litigate against that party rather than against itself').
264 Of course, the people affected may lack standing to bring their own suit. Thus, one
might argue that some agency must defend the interests of those who lack standing to bring
suit themselves. But this objection cannot be squared with the logic behind the Court's
numerous careful curtailments of standing. The Court's efforts to evade deciding certain
disputes-say, generalized grievances against some governmental action-would all be for
naught if those disputes for which no person has standing could be championed by an
agency representing their preferences. For example, the Court has repeatedly indicated
that a party cannot obtain an injunction against a federal official absent a showing of an
injury in fact, and that Congress cannot change this. The Court has even noted approvingly
that some disputes will, by their nature, virtually never have someone with an injury in
fact. But, under the logic of the objection, the Court's insistence on this constitutional limit
on congressional power and federal jurisdiction is more form than substance, as Congress
could simply charge an agency with representing those policy preferences that no person
has an injury in fact to present.
265 See Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v. Puerto Rico ex rel. Barez, 458 U.S. 592, 610 n.16
(1982) ("A State does not have standing as parens patriae to bring an action against the
Federal Government." (citing Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S. 447, 485-86 (1923)).
266 See Note, Inter-Agency Legal Disputes, supra note 4, at 1610 ('The interest of an
executive-branch agency that sues another federal authority in a jurisdictional dispute
stems from the asserted congressional commitment of regulatory power to the plaintiff
agency.").
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regulatory space, but in inconsistent ways. In other contexts,
courts have not hesitated to determine who can speak for the
United States, such as in court.267 By analogy, the argument runs,
feuding agencies are really just trying to figure out which has the
final word on behalf of the United States.
One problem is that this view does not accurately describe the
nature of the cases. When the Department of Justice challenged
the Federal Maritime Commission's approval of shipping
agreements, it did so based on its belief that the FMC misapplied
the law. The DOJ recognized that the FMC had jurisdiction over
the agreements but argued that it got the law wrong. 268 This is
not simply a question of turf-which agency has been statutorily
designated to resolve the matter for the United States-but an
actual request for the courts to pick a side by reviewing the case's
merits.
The more fundamental problem with this approach, however, is
that it assumes that agencies have an interest in regulatory power
for its own sake, and not simply as representatives of the United
States. I think the latter view is the better one. Agency power to
regulate is entirely derivative of being an arm of the sovereign.
And even on matters delegated to an agency to regulate, the
agency acts not in its own right but as the agent of the United
States. 269 And agents of the same principal cannot sue each other
on the principal's behalf.
B. THE LACK OF "CONCRETE ADVERSENESS"

Some have argued that "if an intragovernmental dispute has
actually reached the courts, that very fact indicates concrete

267 E.g., United States v. Providence Journal Co., 485 U.S. 693, 694-95 (1988)
(determining whether DOJ had to file petition for certiorari on behalf of judicially appointed
contempt prosecutor).
268 See United States v. FMC, 694 F.2d 793, 802 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (en banc) (per curiam)
(reprinting panel opinion).
269 Gilles, supra note 228, at 354 (arguing that the government cannot assign sovereign
interests, which can only be carried out by agents); see also Mathew D. McCubbins, Roger
G. Noll & Barry R. Weingast, Administrative Proceduresas Instruments of Political Control,
3 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 243, 248-53 (1987).
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adversity sufficient to satisfy article III."27° Of course, an analysis
that simply considered the functions of standing would be difficult
to square with thirty years of Supreme Court precedent
demanding far more of litigants. 271 However, a lawsuit with only
governmental parties offends not just some abstract formality but
also fails to guarantee that any function of standing is met.
Intragovernmental litigation raises the prospect of collusion and
invites courts to decide matters without the benefit of an
appropriately presented factual record. It can also lead to judicial
involvement before some nongovernmental interest is directly at
stake.
There is little assurance that
Failure of Advocacy.
1.
components of the same government will adequately advocate
opposing interests simply because they march into court against
one another. In fact, government collusion in litigation was
present as early the Attorney General's 1793 mandamus petition
against the Secretary of War, which was brought pursuant to an
agreement between the parties. 272 A more recent effort-offered
by Professor Herz in defense of interagency litigation-illustrates
the danger of collusion between government parties. He suggests
that courts will eventually decide many intragovernmental
273
disputes anyway because a private litigant will eventually sue.
For this reason, Herz argues, it improves the President's
regulatory authority to have the first case litigated solely between
federal parties, "particularly if the agencies settle the case,
thereby protecting themselves against future litigation by entry of
As an example, he cites an EPA
a consent decree." 274
memorandum complaining that the DOJ would not permit the
EPA and the Army to file a consent decree in court that was
intended to act as a "shield" against future litigation involving
Herz, supra note 5, at 898.
E.g., Schlesinger v. Reservists Comm. To Stop the War, 418 U.S. 208, 225 (1974)
(rejecting standing despite "depth of [plaintiffs] commitment" and "the fact that the adverse
parties sharply conflicted in their interests and views and were supported by able briefs and
arguments"); Elliott, supra note 36, at 467-68.
272 Bloch, supra note 33, at 610 & n.164.
273 Herz, supra note 5, at 936.
274 Id. at 936-37.
270

271

1270

GEORGIA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 47:1217

private parties. 275 But such a lawsuit would be the quintessential
collusive suit: an attempt to obtain the imprimatur of a court on a
suit between two parties controlled by a single person (the
President) to the detriment of absent parties with an interest. 276
This example is somewhat extreme, but even without improper
collusion, meaningful adverseness cannot be assumed when
government disagreements spill into court unless one party has
suffered a proprietary harm. To begin, it is difficult to determine
whether any particular dispute was sufficiently genuine or
improperly collusive. To do so would require a standard by which
the measure the motivation of the agencies, the vigor of counsels'
arguments, etc.; such a standard would inevitably be
inconsistently applied and would impose an unwarranted
intrusion into the judgment of the civil servants involved. 277
Perhaps these difficulties explain why the Supreme Court has
declined to hear even well-meaning disputes that were,
278
nevertheless, not truly adverse.
The lack of a private party can lead to important legal issues
being overlooked or not pressed with the vigor of a plaintiff facing
a serious injury. Agencies, for example, have little incentive to
The memorandum explains,
the Department of Army was anxious to have some type of "shield" from
any State, local or citizen action once they reach a compliance agreement
with EPA which may extend beyond statutory deadlines.... [O]ur earlier
strategy of filing such agreements in court to provide the desired 'shield'
has been precluded by DOJ.
Review of Hazardous Waste Disposal Practicesat Federal Facilities:Hearing Before House
Subcomm. of the Comm. on Gov't Operations, 98th Cong. 260 (1983) (statement of Marvin B.
Durning, Assistant Administrator for Enforcement, EPA).
276 Herz, supra note 5, at 936-37 & nn.169-70. Herz acknowledges that such a lawsuit
would "raise[ ] significant article III concerns." Id. at 937 n.169.
277 See generally Neal Devins & Saikrishna B. Prakash, Reverse Advisory Opinions, 80 U.
CHI. L. REv. 859 (2013) (criticizing judicial demands that parties to a case make certain
arguments). Such intrusion is particularly unwarranted given the difficult judgment calls
that good advocates must make about which arguments to press-decisions that become
even more difficult for government attorneys who must also consider the long-term
reputation of the United States in court and broader notions of justice. Catherine H.
Gibson, Representing the United States Abroad: Proper Conduct of U.S. Government
Attorneys in International Tribunals, 45 GEO. J. INT'L L. (forthcoming), availableat http://
papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=2230816.
278 E.g., Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 505 (1961).
275
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make constitutional arguments that would limit their own options
in the future. Of course, it is true that this can also happen when
a private party challenges an agency's policy: an environmental
group might challenge a particular environmental regulation for
being too lax but is unlikely to argue that the regulator's charter is
unconstitutional. Even if an agency is genuinely and entirely
committed to representing its particular slice of the public
interest, to the exclusion of even its own interest (which is
unlikely), it may miscalculate exactly what that interest is. The
presence of a private party supplies an outside perspective that is
necessarily absent in interagency litigation.
2. Lack of Facts. The Court has identified the need for a
specific factual context as a justification for its standing rules.
Without an outside party with an interest in the dispute, there
may be a shortage of facts, at least when the challenging agency is
not a regulated party itself.279 In cases involving a regulated
agency, the factual context will often be clear, and the presence or
absence of an outside party matters little to the record developed
before the court. But consider what happens when one agency
challenges another's decision, despite not falling within the
regulated class. The disagreement between the dueling agencies
likely concerns the factual impact of the regulation. But without
private parties to supply a specific factual context, the agencies are
left to debate abstract points of law and policy in a vacuum. An
outside party crystallizes the legal issue for the court with facts
rather than hypotheticals, generalizations, or estimates. Judicial
resolution thus requires only an application of law to fact, a task
for which judges are well suited.
It is worth pausing a moment to ask whether the "factual
20
context" rationale justifies a standing requirement in all cases.
Challenges to government actions, even constitutional challenges,
are often based on factual findings made by the agency or by
279 See generally David M. Driesen, Standing for Nothing: The Paradox of Demanding
Concrete Context for Formalist Adjudication, 89 CORNELL L. REV. 808 (2004) (recognizing
but criticizing the rule).
280

See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 62 (3d ed.

2006).
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Congress. 28 1
For example, consider a facial constitutional
challenge to a federal statute based on an argument that it
exceeds Congress's Article I power. The plaintiffs in such a
proceeding are unlikely to supply relevant facts for the court to
consider on the merits, but they still must establish how the law
affects them to prove standing. 28 2 Or consider a challenge to an
agency regulation, which is generally reviewed on an
administrative record filed by the agency, with deference to the
agency's factual determinations. How, then, could the factual
concreteness supplied by a party's factual injury aid resolution of
disputes that are limited to a factual record not of the parties'
28 3
making?
This is a fair question, and it merits closer scrutiny than this
Article can provide. 28 4 One answer would be simply to observe
that it has never troubled the Supreme Court, which has insisted
on standing in record-review cases with equal vigor as in other
cases. 28 5 Or perhaps the rule is needed because it is too difficult to
determine at the outset if concrete facts will aid the court, so a
bright-line rule is used as a prophylactic.
A more satisfying answer is that a party with a factual stake in
the controversy is able to make use of the record to supply a
factual context. For example, a party with a factual injury who is
challenging an agency record is better positioned to understand
and highlight relevant portions of the record to supply a factual

281 See Driesen, supra note 279, at 840 ("In three very important classes of casesadministrative law cases, facial constitutional challenges based on individual rights, and
structural constitutional litigation-explicit linkages between injuries and merits
adjudication seldom arise. The requirement of injury-in-fact in such cases usually does
nothing to make litigation more concrete.").
282 See Robert Alleman & Jason Mazzone,
The Case for Returning Politicians to the
Supreme Court, 61 HASTINGS L.J. 1353, 1378-79 (2010) (quoting from Chief Justice
Roberts's confirmation hearing about deference to congressional factfinding); cf. FED. R.
EVID. 201 (discussing legislative facts).
283 Perhaps this dilemma is one reason why the Court has grown increasingly hostile to
facial constitutional challenges because they rely on speculation. See generally Catherine
Gage O'Grady, The Role of Speculationin Facial Challenges, 53 ARIZ. L. REV. 867 (2011).
284 See generally Driesen, supra note 279.
285 See Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 516-18 (2007).
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context for the court's inquiry. 286 It is also able to recognize any
deficiencies in the record and thus, under certain circumstances,
augment the record. 28 7 Even seemingly "pure" questions of law
rarely are: the factual context, and the judges' own perception of
facts, lurks just beneath the surface. 288 A motivated plaintiff who
has been directly injured by a law understands how the law
actually operates and knows when to challenge congressional or
administrative descriptions of the law.
3. The Absence of a Need for JudicialResolution. "The province
of the court is, solely, to decide on the rights of individuals," Chief
Justice Marshall famously declared in Marbury v. Madison.8 9
When allocating power between the branches, the Framers gave
the legislature the power to "prescrib[e] the rules by which the
duties and rights of every citizen are to be regulated" 290 but
forbade it the power "to impose a substantial deprivation on one
person" through the prohibition on bills of attainder and the
reservation of judicial power to the courts. 291 The judiciary, at
least partially insulated from majoritarian whims through the
tenure of its judges, was entrusted with the most vital task of
adjudicating the "rights of individuals." 292 One hopes that the
political branches exercise their power wisely, but it was the
elaborate and impartial processes of the independent judiciary
that was viewed as better serving an individual in any particular
case. Indeed, recent Supreme Court decisions demonstrate that it
greatly prizes judicial resolution of private interests by actually

286 See Abram Chayes, The Role of the Judge in Public Law Litigation, 89 HARv. L. REv.
1281, 1308 (1976) ("If the party structure is sufficiently representative of the interests at
stake, a considerable range of relevant information will be forthcoming. And, because of the
limited scope of the proceeding, the information required can be effectively focused and
specified.... Moreover, the information that is produced will not be filtered through the
rigid structures and preconceptions of bureaucracies.").
287 E.g., Wilson v. Comm'r, 705 F.3d 980, 991 (9th Cir. 2013).
288 United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 614 (2000).
2895 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
290 Plaut v. Spendthrift Farm, Inc., 514 U.S. 211, 222 (1995) (quoting THE FEDERALIST No.
78, at 523, 525 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed. 1961)).
291 Id. at 242 (Breyer, J., concurring) (quoting INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 962 (1983)).
292

THE FEDERALIST No. 78 (Alexander Hamilton).
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mandating the availability of an Article III tribunal for many of
293
these injuries.
The judiciary's resources and political capital are limited. 294 So
perhaps we can understand limiting judicial intervention to cases
involving actual or imminent private injury is an attempt to
conserve the judiciary's most valuable function. As Professor Jaffe
wrote,
Neither the executive nor the legislature is as
dependable as the judiciary in making such
determinations [of private rights] and, if necessary, we
should exclude other functions which might impair the
judiciary's performance of this role. Indeed, if we had
to choose just one function for the judiciary we should
295
choose the administration of justice in this sense.
From the Justices' 1793 refusal to advise the President on
questions of law absent any private interest directly at stake 296 to
E.g., Stern v. Marshall, 131 S. Ct. 2594 (2011).
294 As it is, the judiciary is overworked and may be unable to give sufficient effort to even
293

cases with serious private interests at stake. Even with limited jurisdiction, judges
complain of being overworked and look to timesavers to cope. Courts rely heavily upon
newly minted law school graduates to fulfill the court's duties. Penelope Pether, Sorcerers,
Not Apprentices: How JudicialClerks and Staff Attorneys Impoverish U.S. Law, 39 ARIZ. ST.
L.J. 1, 20 (2007). Circuit courts further minimize their workload by writing unpublished
opinions and unthinkingly following prior decisions under super-strict rules of precedent.
Joseph W. Mead, Stare Decisis in the Inferior Courts of the United States, 12 NEV. L.J. 787,
796-98 (2012). Courts are also quick to find waiver of arguments and to dismiss plausible
cases for technicalities.
Each feature reflects a judiciary straining to fulfill its
constitutionally assigned mission of adjudicating assigned cases and controversies.
Moreover, the federal judiciary cannot be expanded indefinitely: its excellence depends in
part on the rigorous and demanding selection process of its judges. RICHARD A. POSNER,
THE FEDERAL COURTS: CRISIS AND REFORM 30, 99 (1985). Whether any of these features
justifies the Court's restriction on jurisdiction is beyond the scope of this Article. See
Elliott, supra note 36, at 499 ("If the only goal is to reduce the cases the courts hear, then
standing doctrine might be effective. But a doctrine should not randomly choose who can or
cannot sue."); CHEMERINSKY, supra note 280, at 61-62 (arguing that high cost of litigation
prevents courts from being overwhelmed with litigation from ideological plaintiffs).
295Louis L. Jaffe, The Citizen as Litigant in Public Actions: The Non-Hohfeldian or
IdeologicalPlaintiff, 116 U. PA. L. REV. 1033, 1034-35 (1968).
296 The Court later adopted a rule against hearing nonadverse suits that ensures the
asserted interests placed before the Court are genuine, because judicial review "is
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today's rules on standing, the Court can be thought of as asking
whether sufficient private stakes exist to warrant judicial
involvement. 29 7 In this vein, the Court recently advised courts to
devote their resources "to those disputes in which the parties have
a concrete stake." 298 While some might say that courts provide the
wrong answer-by ignoring diffuse ecological harms 299 or the
injury that one suffers when the government establishes another's
30 1
religion' 0 0-but perhaps this is the right question.
legitimate only in the last resort, and as a necessity in the determination of real, earnest,
and vital controversy between individuals." Chi. & Grand Truck Ry. Co. v. Welman, 143
U.S. 339, 345 (1892). Even the exceptions recognized to the requirement of adversity (i.e.,
bankruptcy, naturalization, search warrants) all involve a clearly defined private interest at
stake, further underscoring the Court's concern that it reserve judgment until it is needed.
297 Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs., 528 U.S. 167, 191 (2000).
298 Id.; see also Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498-99 (1975) ("[T]he standing question is
whether the plaintiff has 'alleged such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy'
as to warrant his invocation of federal-court jurisdiction and to justify exercise of the court's
remedial powers on his behalf."); Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation
of Church & State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 474 (1982) (arguing that while the power of judicial
review "is a formidable means of vindicating individual rights, when employed unwisely or
unnecessarily it is also the ultimate threat to the continued effectiveness of the federal
courts in performing that role"); cf. Woolhandler & Collins, supra note 51, at 445-46
(arguing for limited standing of states for similar reasons). The Court has usually advanced
other rationales to explain standing, generally framed as protecting the other branches
from anti-democratic interference from unelected judges.
These protestations about
preserving political power ring somewhat hollow when both Congress and the Executive
want judicial intervention but are denied it by the Court. Elliott, supra note 36, at 496
("For the Court to use standing to defeat that congressional purpose would be to exceed the
bounds of the judicial power."). The Court might instead emphasize that standing benefits
both judges and litigants by conserving the judiciary's resources for when it is needed to
protect individual rights.
299 Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 577 (1992).
300 Ariz. Christian Sch. Tuition Org. v. Winn, 131 S. Ct. 1436 (2011).
301 It is true that the Court has never held that some private interest is all that is
required to establish standing. Its approval of qui tam actions even though the plaintiff
simply asserts an interest derivative of the government illustrates this point. Vt. Agency of
Natural Res. v. United States ex rel. Stevens, 529 U.S. 765 (2000). The plaintiffs share of
the award suffices to support jurisdiction. The qui tam example underscores that Congress
can articulate which private rights are actionable-as long as there are private interests in
the case. Further, the Court has held that states have interests worth protecting, even
though they are also sovereign. But, at least at one point, states actually were limited to
proprietary injuries-in other words, they were treated like individuals. Woolhandler &
Collins, supra note 51, at 399-407. Moreover, separate sovereigns (like Indian tribes and
foreign governments) have a constitutionally imposed distinctness that distinguishes their
disputes from an agency's.
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Litigation involving only the sovereign's inability to make up its
mind lacks the private injuries that courts were designed to
protect through adjudication. In fact, agencies have an influence
that nongovernmental parties can only dream of 302 Most agencies
can appeal directly to the President, who can pick a winner among
competing agencies.
Even agencies with some measure of
insulation from the President have a strategic interest in
cooperating with other agencies, making judicial intervention
superfluous. Every agency is at least partially reliant on others,
particularly those with shared regulatory space. If an agency
unilaterally asserts and prevails on a single position, the other
agency can push back on other positions. 3 3 Moreover, agencies
have a direct connection to the President, who can control budget
requests and the appointment of agency heads, even for those
agencies with a measure of independence. 30 4 In sum, disagreeing
agencies may rely on many alternatives short of litigation to
accomplish their goals.
One could argue that litigation supplies strong proof that the
dispute cannot be resolved internally, making judicial resolution
needed. 30 5 But this need not be true: agencies might in certain
circumstances view litigation as a more predictable, less costly,
and less politically risky vehicle to challenge another's decision. It
may also be less intrusive for an agency to obtain a court order
against another agency than endure the friction of tense
negotiation over a policy. Similarly, agencies might desire a
judicial resolution to their impasse to avoid making a difficult
political decision. "Elected officials in the United States encourage
or tacitly support judicial policymaking both as a means of
avoiding political responsibility for making tough decisions and as
a means of pursuing controversial policy goals that they cannot

302 See generally J.R. DeShazo & Jody Freeman, PublicAgencies as Lobbyists, 105 COLUM.
L. REV. 2217 (2005) (describing effectiveness of agencies lobbying independent agencies to
change its behavior).
303 See Barkow, supra note 256, at 43-44.
304See id.
305 See Herz, supra note 5, at 904.
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30 6
publicly advance through open legislative and electoral politics."
But even if we indulge the assumption that interagency litigation
could resolve a deadlock within the government, this still would
not justify judicial intervention; the competing interests at stake
are still only the differing views of government officials about how
the Executive Branch should implement the law.
Delaying judicial intervention until a nonsovereign interest is
at stake ensures that courts will spend their efforts where they are
most needed. Interagency litigation could involve questions that
would never be presented to the courts by a nongovernmental
party. Perhaps no one outside the government would have
standing or, even with standing, the incentive to bring the
litigation. But even if the litigation will be brought eventually, it
is better that the interested party control the litigation, rather
than trusting the agency to advocate successfully for its interests.
For example, the Supreme Court found it had no jurisdiction to
review Congress's challenge to the line-item veto but held the veto
unconstitutional the following Term when a challenge was brought
by parties outside of the U.S. Government. 3 7 "All that was
changed was the perceived nature of the Court's role-it was
acting as protector of various private and public entities against
the waywardness of the Act, not sitting as direct arbiter of
congressional and presidential powers. That difference was a
powerful reason to deny congressional standing' but hear the case
when brought by injured outside parties. 30 8
4. Questions of Law Versus Questions of Policy. A final
argument in defense of interagency litigation might be that, so
long as courts are confined to questions of law, there is no real
danger of inappropriate judicial involvement in Executive Branch
policy. 30 9 The argument would note that, even in interagency

306

Mark A. Graber, The Nonmajoritarian Difficulty: Legislative Deference to the

Judiciary,7 STUD. AM. POL. DEV. 35, 37 (1993).
307 Compare Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811, 813-30 (1997), with Clinton v. City of New
York, 524 U.S. 417, 420-36 (1998).
308 13B WRIGHT ETAL., supra note 187, § 3531.11.2.
309 Herz, supra note 5, at 936 ("To say that interagency litigation requires courts to
resolve disputes over regulatory policy is also misleading. Such a judicial role would be
unseemly at best.
Although the policy disagreement-for example, should this
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litigation, courts will be asked to resolve questions of law, not
some general question of policy. Although this is true enough in
the abstract, this characterization loses its significance in the
application to particular disputes.
At the level of agency
disagreement, the questions of law are extremely difficult and rely
more on questions of assigning deference rather than the usual
tools of judicial construction. They are also likely to be extremely
controversial politically. These are exactly the arenas where a
robust empirical literature suggests that judges will act on their
policy preferences rather than in a judicial capacity. 310
In
addition, the more detached that questions of law become from any
particular
facts
(or the
interests of any particular
nongovernmental party), the more that they look like questions of
policy better resolved administratively than judicially.
V. CONCLUSION
In sum, there is but one United States, and bureaucratic
disagreements cannot create a case where one does not otherwise
exist. The United States lacks a sovereign interest in reversing
itself, and there is no adverseness when two components of the
United States assert the same interest in court. Only when a
common law interest is at stake-either by a plaintiff, a defendant,
or both-may federal courts adjudicate a dispute.
This conclusion, compelled not only by the specific cases that
have addressed interagency litigation but also by the general
concepts of Article III standing, has ramifications well beyond the
next lawsuit between federal agencies. A limit on interagency
litigation underscores Congress's inability to shift power from the

hydroelectric project go ahead?-may be what got the case into court in the first place, it is
not the issue that the court will resolve. Rather, the court will decide legal issues, fulfilling
a judicial rather than an executive function, exactly as it does in litigation between the
government and a private party.").
310 Thomas J. Miles & Cass R. Sunstein, The Real World of Arbitrariness Review, 75 U.
CHI. L. REV. 761, 813 (2008); Emerson H. Tiller & Frank B. Cross, A Modest Proposalfor
Improving American Justice, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 215, 220-24 (1999); Cass R. Sunstein &
Thomas J. Miles, DepoliticizingAdministrative Law, 58 DUKE L.J. 2193, 2228 (2009).
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Executive to the Judiciary 3 "' and prevents the Executive from
running to the courts to get out of making a difficult decision or
avoid political responsibility. 312 By using interagency litigation as
a case study in Article III, we gain unique insight into the contours
of the requirements of adverseness and standing. And this Article
provides new way of looking at standing: not simply as a limitation
to frustrate plaintiffs but as a way of defining the relationship
between plaintiff and defendant. Finally, by studying interagency
litigation, we gain a clearer understanding of what it means for
the United States to appear in its courts.

311Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 577 (1992); Elliott, supra note 36, at 463
("[S]tanding acts as a bulwark against congressional overreaching, preventing Congress
from conscripting the courts in its battles with the executive branch.").
312 Cf. NFIB v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2602 (2012) (opinion of Roberts, C.J.)
("Permitting the Federal Government to force the States to implement a federal program
would threaten the political accountability key to our federal system. '[W]here the Federal
Government directs the States to regulate, it may be state officials who will bear the brunt
of public disapproval, while the federal officials who devised the regulatory program may
remain insulated from the electoral ramifications of their decision.' " (quoting New York v.
United States, 505 U.S. 144, 169 (1995)).

